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ABSTRACT
In both the United States and the nations of Western Europe,
significant constitutional commitments safeguard both expressive
freedom (including freedom of speech and of the press) and also a
generalized constitutional right of privacy. With some regularity,
however, these rights will come into conflict, as the protection of one
right can be achieved only at the cost of abridging or denying the
other. When a government official or public figure objects to the
publication of an embarrassing photograph, perhaps taken by an
invasive paparazzo, it is simply not possible to fully vindicate both
a newspaper’s interest in publishing the photograph and the subject’s
interest in privacy. Although generalizations often oversimplify
complex legal, cultural, and moral understandings, it nevertheless
remains true that European courts tend to place greater relative
emphasis on safeguarding privacy than do courts in the United
States. Thus, the standard narrative posits that the United States
gives an absolute priority to speech, over vindication of privacy inter-
ests, whereas European law tends to discount the importance of
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expressive freedom in favor of more reliably safeguarding privacy. At
one level of analysis, this standard account gets things right—
protected speech is both wider and deeper on this side of the Atlantic
than in contemporary Europe. This standard account, however,
underestimates the European commitment to protecting expressive
freedom; the European commitment to safeguarding privacy does
not, and will not, invariably override free speech. A comparative
legal analysis also demonstrates that privacy is far from dead in the
United States. Going forward, the challenges presented by the advent
of “Big Data” and society-wide government surveillance programs
increasingly will require both the United States and Europe to see
privacy as an essential condition for safeguarding speech. Demo-
cratic self-government presupposes an ongoing dialogue among
citizens, but an open dialogue about government simply cannot exist
in a surveillance state. In the brave new world of PRISM and secret
government manipulation of metadata, we must recognize that
privacy and speech are fundamentally complementary, rather than
competing, human rights. Moreover, this is a lesson that comparative
legal analysis can teach.
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INTRODUCTION
Since its landmark decision in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
the Supreme Court of the United States has been remarkably
vigilant in safeguarding the First Amendment’s protection of free-
dom of speech and freedom of the press.1 In an important series of
cases, the Justices extended the right of fair criticism of public offi-
cials to reach not only public figures, but even private figures who
become enmeshed in matters of public concern.2 As a general propo-
sition, a media defendant may be liable for money damages only if
a plaintiff can show that a false statement of fact concerning a
public official, a public figure, or a person involved in a matter of
public concern was made with actual malice, that is, with either
knowledge of falsity or with reckless indifference to the truth or
falsity of the assertion.3
But, the constitutionalization of the law of tort—and by implica-
tion, the displacement of privacy—only begins with the actual
malice standard. Even if a plaintiff prevails at trial, a media defen-
dant is entitled to a close review of the factual basis of the verdict
on appeal;4 only if the plaintiff has proven the case with clear and
convincing evidence may the adverse verdict against the press enti-
ty stand.5 This appellate review of “constitutional facts” provides yet
another layer of protection to media defendants—and another road-
block against recovery that a plaintiff must successfully overcome.
Of course, the protection of speech and the press in the United
States extends well beyond the demanding standard for establishing
liability for libel under the law of defamation. The protection also
encompasses the right to engage in outrageous parody, which exists,
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See, e.g., Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986); Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
3. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
4. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 498-501 (1984) (requiring that ap-
pellate courts independently review issues of constitutional fact in defamation cases brought
against media defendants by public officials and persons involved in matters of public con-
cern).
5. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 342-43 (requiring “clear and convincing” evidence of malice in order
for public officials, public figures, and persons involved in matters of public concern to prevail
against a media defendant).
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at least in part, to inflict emotional harm on its subjects.6 Protected
speech also includes public protest designed to be intentionally
invasive and offensive; provided that the speech activity is other-
wise lawful, the fact that it violates basic notions of human decency
and privacy does not determine whether it enjoys constitutional
protection.7 The contemporary First Amendment even protects ob-
jectively false speech—at least in the absence of some concrete harm
associated with its dissemination.8 Thus, the First Amendment not
only requires constitutional protection of false speech,9 but also
creates a zone of protection for outrageous and offensive speech.
Given the one-sided, speech-favoring outcomes of the New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, and Snyder
v. Phelps line of cases, it should not be particularly surprising that
other polities, also sharing a serious constitutional commitment to
protecting expressive freedom, have chosen not to follow the U.S.
approach to reconciling free speech with other constitutional values,
including privacy, dignity, and personal honor. In much of Western
Europe, in fact, concerns rooted in protecting personal privacy and
dignity routinely take precedence over claims associated with free-
dom of speech and the press.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), seated in Stras-
bourg, France, hears and decides cases brought by individuals
against signatories to the European Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, commonly referred
to as the European Convention on Human Rights (European Con-
vention).10 The European Convention is an instrument created by
the Council of Europe, an entity that includes not only all twenty-
6. Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988).
7. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1219 (2011).
8. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2543-44, 2547-49 (2012) (holding that
false speech that does not cause any independent harm is protected under the First Amend-
ment).
9. See id. at 2545 (“The Court has never endorsed the categorical rule the Government
advances: that false statements receive no First Amendment protection. Our prior decisions
have not confronted a measure, like the Stolen Valor Act, that targets falsity and nothing
more.”).
10. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, 224 [hereinafter European Convention].
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eight member states of the European Union (EU),11 but many others
as well.12
The ECHR creates and enforces a kind of pan-European law that
signatory states and the Court of Justice of the European Union, the
EU’s highest juridical entity, generally will follow in their own
jurisprudence.13 As Chief Justice John L. Murray, of Ireland, noted,
11. As of July 1, 2013, the European Union has twenty-eight member nations. See EU
Member Countries, EUROPA, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/member-countries/index_ en.
htm [http://perma.cc/Z26K-3VYD] (last visited Mar.22, 2015) (noting that “[t]he union reached
its current size of 28 member countries with the accession of Croatia on 1 July 2013” and pro-
viding a list of member states along with the year of their entry into the European Union)
(emphasis omitted).
12. The Council of Europe currently has forty-seven member states, encompassing a
population of over 820 million persons. See The Council of Europe in Brief, COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, http://coe.int/en/web/about-us/who-we-are [http://perma.cc/Y3SX-ZG3A] (last visited
Mar. 22, 2015). In addition, six nations—Canada, Holy See, Israel, Japan, Mexico, and the
United States—hold official “observer status.” The Council of Europe and Non-Member States,
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/en/the-council-of-europe-and-non-member-states/
[http://perma.cc/5ZFP-E54A] (last visited Mar. 4, 2015).
13. See Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 51, 2000 O.J. (C 364)
1, 8, 21 (providing the EU will respect rights recognized in the European Convention);
Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union, art. 6(2), 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145, 153
(“The Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November
1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as
general principles of Community law.”). These formal provisions simply codified the preexis-
ting practices of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which declared its intention to
follow the precedents of the ECHR many decades ago. See Case 4/73, Nold v. Comm’n, 1974
E.C.R. 491, 507 (“In safeguarding these rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from
constitutional traditions common to the Member States, and it cannot therefore uphold
measures which are incompatible with fundamental rights recognized and protected by the
Constitutions of those States.”); Case 26/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, 1969 E.C.R.
419, 425 (holding that rights secured under the European Convention are “enshrined in the
general principles of Community law and protected by the Court”); see also Joined Cases 44/87
& 227/88, Hoechst AG v. Comm’n, 1989 E.C.R. 2859, 2923 (holding that European Convention
rules on procedural due process apply to investigations for price fixing); Case 44/79, Hauer
v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, 1979 E.C.R. 3727, 3744-45 (“[F]undamental rights form an integral
part of the general principles of the law, the observance of which it ensures; that in safe-
guarding those rights, the Court is bound to draw inspiration from constitutional traditions
common to the Member States, so that measures which are incompatible with the fundamen-
tal rights recognized by the constitutions of those States are unacceptable in the Community;
and that, similarly, international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the
Member States have collaborated or of which they are signatories, can supply guidelines
which should be followed within the framework of Community law.”); Joseph H.H. Weiler,
Eurocracy and Distrust: Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice
in the Protection of Fundamental Human Rights Within the Legal Order of the European
Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103, 1105 (1986) (discussing the creation of a “judge-made
2015] RECONCILING PRIVACY AND SPEECH 1285
“Since the mid-1990s in particular, the Court of Justice [of the Euro-
pean Union] has increasingly looked to the European Convention on
Human Rights for inspiration as to the nature and scope, or even
existence, of fundamental rights in Community law, having recog-
nized the preeminent position of the Convention by 1991.”14 He
added, “In doing so, the Court of Justice [of the European Union]
has adopted a somewhat deferential position to the Strasbourg
Court in the interpretation of fundamental rights that are contained
in the Convention.”15
Strictly speaking, all signatories to the European Convention are
bound to implement the decisions of the ECHR.16 So too, the Euro-
pean Union will, as a general matter, follow decisions of the ECHR
in interpreting and applying the EU’s governing treaties, statutes,
and regulations.17 The European Union is in the process of becoming
a signatory to the European Convention, and in consequence, direct-
ly subject to the jurisdiction of the ECHR.18 In sum, the decisions of
higher law of fundamental human rights, culled from the constitutional traditions of the
Member States and international agreements such as the European Convention on Human
Right (ECHR)”). The Court of Justice of the European Union has specifically noted that
Article 8, which protects privacy, constitutes part of basic legal principles of the European
Union. See Case C-62/90, Comm’n v. Fed. Republic of Ger., 1992 E.C.R. I-2575, I-2609.
14. John L. Murray, The Influence of the European Convention on Fundamental Rights
on Community Law, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1388, 1394-95 (2010) (footnotes omitted).
15. Id. at 1395.
16. See id. at 1397.
17. Id. The European Union is in discussions with the Council of Europe to become a full
member and presumably accede to the European Convention. See The Council of Europe and
the European Union: Different Roles, Shared Values, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, http://hub.coe.int/
web/coe-portal/european-union [http://perma.cc/BBQ5-S2JU] (last visited Mar. 4, 2015). In
May of 2007, the Council of Europe and the European Union formalized their relationship
through a joint Memorandum of Understanding. See Memorandum of Understanding Between
the Council of Europe and the European Union (May 23, 2007), available at http://perma.
cc/8L4S-RGSU. In relevant part, the Memorandum provides that “[t]he Council of Europe will
remain the benchmark for human rights, the rule of law, and democracy in Europe,” and
“[t]he European Union regards the Council of Europe as the Europe-wide reference source for
human rights.” Id. Consistent with these principles, “[i]n the field of human rights and
fundamental freedoms, coherence of Community and European Union law with the relevant
conventions of the Council of Europe will be ensured.” Id.
18. See Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Amending the Control System of the Convention, Strasbourg art.
17(2), May 13, 2004, C.E.T.S. No. 194 (amending Article 59 of the European Convention to
provide that “[t]he European Union may accede to this Convention”). Protocol 14 went into
effect on June 1, 2010. Protocol 14 Enters into Force, ECHR BLOG (Jun. 1, 2010), http://
echrblog.blogspot.com/2010/06/protocol-14-enters-into-force.html [http://perma.cc/CZ6M-8FDJ]
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the ECHR constitute a body of pan-European law that is meant to
express and embody the contemporary human rights practices of the
signatory states.19
Careful consideration of how the ECHR has attempted to
reconcile privacy and speech provides a useful alternative baseline
for considering how to resolve conflicts between these rights. More-
over, as all democratic societies struggle with how best to control
and constrain the potential ill effects of Big Data and the new sur-
veillance technologies that make effective use of Big Data possible,
the question of how to integrate privacy and speech is more pressing
than ever. Alexander Meiklejohn famously argued that free speech
constitutes an essential condition for the maintenance of democratic
self-government.20 I would argue, in turn, that privacy is integral to
maintaining effective protection for the freedom of speech; it is
difficult to posit democratic self-government in the absence of
meaningful privacy rights (at least against the government).21
(noting that “[t]oday, a bit over six years after it was opened for ratifications, Protocol 14
finally entered into force” and observing that Protocol 14 “opens up the possibility of EU
accession to the [European Convention]”).
19. See Murray, supra note 14, at 1397.
20. ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 22-
27, 88-89 (1948); see also infra Part II. Meiklejohn argues that “unabridged freedom of public
discussion is the rock on which our goverment stands.” MEIKLEJOHN, supra, at 20.
21. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 70 (arguing that “public intelligence” is a key ele-
ment of creating a citizenry capable of effective self-government). A surveillance state produc-
es a profound chilling effect on freedom of political inquiry. Meiklejohn posits that “[w]e are
saying that the citizens of the United States will be fit to govern themselves under their own
institutions only if they have faced squarely and fearlessly everything that can be said in
favor of those institutions, everything that can be said against them.” Id. at 91. Bold inquiries
into the first principles of governing institutions and ideologies simply will not exist in a
surveillance state.
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The specter of “Big Brother” watching22 will undoubtedly have
profound implications for the exercise of expressive freedoms—in-
deed for the very idea of democracy itself.23 If a population is to
engage in a process of democratic self-government, it must be
capable of free and unimpeded collective discussions related to
government.24 The loss of privacy, however, could either impede or
preclude these conversations—conversations integral to the process
of democratic self government. 
This Article proceeds in three main parts. Part I considers the
important ways in which the standard narrative—the United States
is all about speech whereas Europe is all about privacy—gets things
right. Highly salient points of conflict exist between U.S. and Euro-
pean approaches to reconciling privacy and speech; these differences
are real and cannot simply be ignored. For example, neither false
speech nor speech designed to humiliate or embarrass its subject
enjoys the same level of constitutional solicitude in Europe as in the
contemporary United States. Moreover, these disagreements include
not only differences in substantive legal doctrine, but also important
methodological differences in adjudicating human rights claims. At
a general level of analysis, interests rooted in privacy, dignity, and
personal honor often take priority over vindicating free speech and
press claims in the decisions of the ECHR.
22. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, at 2 (1949); see also GARY BRUCE, THE FIRM: THE INSIDE STORY
OF THE STASI 106-161 (2010) (discussing the history of Stasi operations in East Germany);
JOHN O. KOEHLER, STASI: THE UNTOLD STORY OF THE EAST GERMAN SECRET POLICE 9-10, 18-
21 (1999) (discussing the reach of Stasi power and the harsh results when the Stasi learned
of intentions to leave East Germany). As Koehler puts it, “Like a giant octopus, the Stasi’s
tentacles probed every aspect of life.” KOEHLER, supra at 9. Moreover, “Stasi officers knew no
limits and had no shame when it came to ‘protecting the party and the state.’” Id. East
Germany’s effort to construct an effective police state were minutely detailed and highly
successful. See id. at 8-9 (“To ensure that the people would become and remain submissive,
East German communist leaders saturated their realm with more spies than had any other
totalitarian government in recent history.”); id. at 9 (noting that if one adds up full-time Stasi
officers, regular Stasi informers, and part-time Stasi informers, “the result is nothing short
of monstrous: one informer per 6.5 citizens”). To be clear, I would not argue that current
efforts by governments in democratic states to collect metadata are the equivalent of the
Stasi’s domestic spying efforts. On the other hand, the collection and storage of such mass
quantities of data plainly create troubling possibilities for efforts to control and manipulate
the population that ought to give reasonable observers at least some pause.
23. See infra Part III.
24. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 88-89.
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Part II considers the ways in which U.S. and European human
rights law share some important, but underappreciated, common
ground. Privacy is far from dead in the United States, and European
human rights law includes significant protection for the freedom of
speech. In some important respects, the standard account fails to
acknowledge adequately the fact that American and European law
share common animating goals and purposes—notably including
recognition of the inextricable link between protection for freedom
of speech and the process of democratic self-government. Thus, it
would be incorrect to conclude that only points of conflict exist
between the United States and Europe on the relevant salience of
privacy and speech. Part II also posits that protecting free speech
does not invariably and inevitably preclude any legal protection for
privacy or human dignity in the United States. Thus, the European
approach places significant value on the importance of freedom of
expression, and the United States sometimes limits speech to
safeguard privacy interests.
Finally, Part III considers the problem of Big Data25 and the
challenges that will have to be addressed successfully in order to
protect privacy and speech going forward into the future. The ability
of government and private entities to amass vast quantities of data
has obvious, and negative, implications for the prospects of securing
privacy interests. Perhaps less obvious, however, is that this same
ability to collect, analyze, and manipulate metadata could also have
a significant chilling effect on the exercise of expressive freedoms as
well. Part III argues that contemporary European efforts to control
both governmental and private use of metadata merit careful
consideration in the United States.
In sum, this Article seeks to identify both points of agreement and
also points of conflict in the privacy jurisprudence of the United
States and Europe. In so doing, a better understanding of the values
that undergird both privacy and speech should result.
This exercise also will demonstrate that, although privacy and
speech are often presented as conflicting values, in the era of Big
Data, protecting privacy might prove to be an essential condition for
25. For a discussion of the meaning of Big Data and the challenges it poses to privacy, in-
novation, and democracy itself, see Julie E. Cohen, What Privacy Is For, 126 HARV. L. REV.
1904, 1905-11 (2014), and Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward
a Framework to Redress Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 93-99 (2014).
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safeguarding the exercise of free speech rights. Despite a tendency
to think of privacy and speech as conflicting values, we should be
open to the possibility that technology will require us to think of
them as essentially complementary values instead.
I. EUROPE AND PRIVACY: EXPLORING SALIENT POINTS OF CONFLICT
WITH THE UNITED STATES
It is easy, obvious even, to identify important points of difference
in the European and U.S. approaches to defining and protecting
privacy. First, a significant methodological difference distinguishes
judicial enforcement of privacy rights in Europe from the baseline
approach in the United States. In Europe, the doctrine of propor-
tionality generally requires that a court, after finding that a funda-
mental right (including privacy) has been breached, must then
balance the degree of the infringement against the state’s justifica-
tions for enacting the regulation.26 Although this doctrine is often
unfamiliar to U.S. law professors and lawyers, it is commonplace in
the wider world.27 As Professors Huscroft, Miller, and Webber
observe, in the global context, “[t]o speak of human rights is to
speak of proportionality.”28 Simply stated, establishing that a right
secured by the European Convention has been abridged or denied
is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for establishing a valid
constitutional claim.
Second, and no less important, privacy rights in Europe are
significantly broader in scope than in the United States. This
reflects the fact that privacy is a positive right as well as a negative
right.29 But it also reflects significant doctrinal differences about the
26. See Grant Huscroft et al., Introduction to PROPORTIONALITY AND THE RULE OF LAW:
RIGHTS, JUSTIFICATION, AND REASONING 1, 1-4 (Grant Huscroft et al. eds., 2014) (discussing
the concept of proportionality in constitutional adjudication and its tremendous importance
to the adjudication of human rights in many national and international legal systems).
27. Id. at 1.
28. Id.
29. See Söderman v. Sweden, App. No. 5786/08, at 22 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013), http://hudoc.
echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-128043?TID=mpdiodvsxq [http://perma.cc/LM63-8B
ZG] (holding that Article 8 “does not merely compel the state to abstain” from violations, but
also “in addition to this primarily negative undertaking, there are positive obligations inher-
ent in an effective respect for private or family life”). Thus, in order to comply with European
Convention obligations, a signatory state’s “obligations may involve the adoption of measures
designed to secure respect for private life even in the sphere of the relations of individuals
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conditions under which a person may hold a “reasonable expectation
of privacy”—for example, in Europe, it is quite plausible to be pri-
vate in public places.30
Third, and finally, in European jurisprudence, both courts and
legislatures have shown a greater willingness to adopt and enforce
(often strictly) mandatory civility norms that protect not only ordin-
ary citizens but also public officials and public figures.31 Rather than
leveling everyone down to the position of the average, ordinary
person, mandatory forms of politesse have been democratized and
extended to each and every person within the community.32 This
approach means that, at least in theory, everyone is deserving of
dignity, respect, and personal honor;33 but, it imposes significant
limitations on speech and press rights with respect to public offi-
cials, public figures, and private persons involved in matters of
public concern.34
A. Balancing and Proportionality
In many foreign legal systems, the scope of rights are never
categorical. Instead, rights are held only contingently and courts
must balance a law or policy that burdens or denies a protected
right against the government’s rationale for enacting and enforcing
the law or policy on the facts presented.35 In general, permissible
between themselves.” Id.
30. See Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 66.
31. See James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1194 (2004).
32. Id. at 1165, 1194-95.
33. See Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 71 (“The Court reiterates the
fundamental importance of protecting private life from the point of view of the development
of every human being’s personality.” (emphasis added)); id. (“The Court considers that anyone,
even if they are known to the general public, must be able to enjoy a ‘legitimate expectation’
of protection of and respect for their private life.” (emphasis added)); see also James Q.
Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect: Three Societies, 109 YALE L.J. 1279, 1319-21, 1344,
1358-59, 1384 (2000) (noting that European law places greater relative emphasis on interests
related to personal honor, dignity, and civility and enforces these cultural norms through
positive law).
34. See Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 71-72.
35. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
32, 131-133 (Doron Kalir trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012) (2010); see Huscroft et al.,
supra note 26, at 1 (noting that many national legal systems, including “courts in continental
Europe, the United Kingdom, Canada, New Zealand, Israel, and South Africa,” as well as
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limitations on rights must be prescribed by law and necessary in a
democratic society.36 This is the standard metric used to delimit the
scope of all rights protected under the European Convention.37
Consistent with this approach, establishing that a fundamental
right, like privacy, has been abridged is a necessary, but not
sufficient, predicate for successfully obtaining judicial relief. After
a plaintiff (or applicant, to use the ECHR’s preferred nomenclature)
establishes that a breach has occurred, the burden then shifts to the
government to establish that the balancing exercise favors uphold-
ing the impugned law or policy rather than invalidating it.
One should be careful to note that this balancing exercise occurs
only after a plaintiff has successfully invoked a particular right. As
a preliminary matter, a person seeking the protection of a right
secured under the European Convention must first successfully
assert that a breach of that right has taken place. For example, in
Botta v. Italy, the ECHR found that the applicant, Botta, had failed
to successfully state a cognizable privacy claim, and accordingly, the
court did not engage in proportionality analysis.38 Botta, who was
physically disabled, claimed that Italy had failed to adequately
protect his ability to access and enjoy places of public accommoda-
tion, such as beaches operated by private concessionaires.39
“treaty-based legal systems such as the European Court of Human Rights” all utilize
proportionality analysis when adjudicating human rights claims). It bears noting that signif-
icant variations exist among and between legal systems with respect to the definition and
application of the proportionality doctrine; accordingly “it is not clear that the different uses
are mere variations on a common concept.” Huscroft et al., supra note 26, at 3.
36. See R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 135-40 (Can.). Oakes provides a classic explica-
tion of the proportionality principle and has been widely adopted in jurisdictions beyond
Canada. See Vicki C. Jackson, Being Proportional About Proportionality, 21 CONST. COMMENT.
803, 804-07 (2004). As Jackson observes, “Canada has played a particularly influential role
in the transnational development of proportionality testing in constitutional law.” Id. at 804.
37. See Huscroft et al., supra note 26, at 1 (“It is no exaggeration to claim that propor-
tionality has overtaken rights as the orienting idea in contemporary human rights law and
scholarship.”); see also DAVID M. BEATTY, THE ULTIMATE RULE OF LAW 163-68 (2004) (arguing
that courts should focus less on the elucidation and definition of substantive rights and more
on the application of the proportionality principle).
38. Botta v. Italy, App. No. 21439/93, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 241, 247 (1998) (noting the
ECHR’s observation in its preliminary decision that “[i]n effect, the applicant [Botta] is com-
plaining of an interference with his private life and personal development caused by the
State’s failure to adopt the measures necessary to rectify omissions on the part of the conces-
sionaires private beaches”).
39. Id. at 242-43, 246. Italy actually maintained a law requiring that persons with disabil-
ities enjoy access to public accommodations, including beaches, but pre-existing contracts to
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Article 8(1) of the European Convention provides that “[e]veryone
has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and
his correspondence.”40 However, this right is limited by operation of
Article 8(2), which states that:
There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as in accordance with the law
and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the
country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protec-
tion of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others.41
In order to invoke Article 8 successfully, Botta had to claim an
interest falling within the scope of protection. The ECHR squarely
rejected Botta’s Article 8 claim, holding that
the right asserted by Botta, namely the right to gain access to
the beach and the sea at a place distant from his normal place
of residence during his holidays, concerns interpersonal relation-
ships of such broad and indeterminate scope that there can be no
conceivable direct link between the measures the State was
urged to take in order to make good the omissions of the private
bathing establishments and the applicant’s private life.42
Because Botta failed to state a claim falling within the rubric of
Article 8’s protection, the ECHR did not have to engage in propor-
tionality analysis to determine if Italy’s failure to ensure access to
privately operated beaches was prescribed by law and demonstrably
necessary in a free and democratic society.43
In the specific context of privacy claims, scope of coverage
questions often arise in public or commercial settings. For example,
does a lawyer have an Article 8 claim with respect to his client
files?44 Does a person teaching religion in a state-sponsored, but
operate beach facilities were exempted from this obligation. See id. at 244.
40. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 8(1).
41. Id. art. 8(2).
42. Botta, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. at 258.
43. See id.
44. See Niemetz v. Germany, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. 23, 33 (1992).
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religiously affiliated, secondary school have a privacy interest in not
being discharged because of his marital status?45 Although the pro-
vision of professional services and employment in state-supported
schools might not initially seem to implicate “respect for [one’s]
private and family life,”46 in both instances, the ECHR found that
the claims at bar fell within the scope of Article 8’s coverage.47
However, even though the concept of one’s private life “is a broad
term not susceptible to exhaustive definition,”48 the concept of
privacy is not infinite in scope.49
In sum, the scope of application of a particular right presents an
essential—and quite mandatory—first step in establishing a valid
claim under the European Convention. Only after the applicant
meets this initial threshold will the ECHR proceed to ascertain
whether the restriction or abridgement at issue is “in accordance
with the law,” in pursuance of a legitimate aim, and “necessary in
a democratic society.”50 The balancing exercise is crucial to deter-
mining whether the claimant will prevail, but it constitutes the
second part of a two-step analysis.
In the United States, by way of contrast, such balancing tends to
occur, but usually before a violation has been held to exist.51 In the
45. Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, at 3-6, 28-30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-145068?TID=lwclecsgaf [http://perma.
cc/9JBC-97M8].
46. European Convention, supra note 10, at art. 8(1).
47. See Fernández Martínez, App. No. 56030/07, at 29 (holding that “there is no reason of
principle to consider why the notion of ‘private life’ should be taken to exclude professional
activities”); Niemetz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 33-34 (“There appears, furthermore, to be no reason
of principle why this understanding of the notion of ‘private life’ should be taken to exclude
activities of a professional or business nature since it is, after all, in the course of their
working lives that the majority of people have a significant, if not the greatest, opportunity
of developing relationships with the outside world.”); id. at 34 (“More generally, to interpret
the words ‘private life’ and ‘home’ as including certain professional or business activities or
premises would be consonant with the essential object and purpose of Article 8, namely to
protect the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities.”).
48. Fernández Martínez, App. No. 56030/07, at 15.
49. See Botta v. Italy, App. No. 21439/93, 26 Eur. H.R. Rep. 241, 257-58 (1998) (finding
that Article 8 is not applicable in the context of a claim that Italy had an Article 8 obligation
to enact broader protections for disabled persons to access places of public accommodation).
50. See Niemetz, 251 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 35 (setting forth and analyzing each of these
elements after Niemetz had successfully invoked the protection of Article 8).
51. See Jackson, supra note 36, at 803 (noting that “[i]f you have not heard of [the propor-
tionality doctrine], that is because the concept has received far more elaboration and evalu-
ation outside the United States”).
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context of free speech, for example, child pornography52 and obscen-
ity53 are said to exist outside the scope of “the freedom of speech”
protected by the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause. Political
speech, however, is said to rest at the very heart of the First Amend-
ment.54 Implicit in this dichotomy is a hidden balancing exercise
that measures the social value of child pornography and obscene
speech and finds that the government interest in suppressing this
speech—including adoption and enforcement of criminal sanctions
for the creation, distribution, or possession of such material— over-
bears whatever social value this speech arguably might possess.55
Although formally presented as a form of categorical protection—
speech either falls within or outside the scope of the First Amend-
ment’s Free Speech Clause—the underlying logic relies on a kind of
utilitarian social balancing.56 In Europe, this balancing is overt and
direct, and occurs automatically after a litigant has successfully
invoked the constitutional free speech guarantee.57 Moreover, even
52. See generally Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982). For an analysis and critique of the categorical exclusion of nude images of children
from any First Amendment protection, see Amy Adler, Inverting the First Amendment, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 921, 925-26 (2001); and Amy Adler, The Perverse Law of Child Pornography,
103 COLUM. L. REV. 209, 213 (2001) [hereinafter Adler, Perverse Law of Child Pornography].
53. See generally Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). For a thoughtful analysis and
critique of the exclusion of obscenity from First Amendment protection, see Amy Adler, All
Porn All the Time, 31 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 695 (2007); and Andrew Koppelman,
Does Obscenity Cause Moral Harm?, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1635 (2005).
54. See Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) (“At the heart of the First
Amendment is the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of ideas and
opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467 (1980)
(observing that speech related to self-governance and politics stands “on the highest rung of
the hierarchy of First Amendment values”); First Nat’l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776
(1978) (noting that political speech rests “at the heart of the First Amendment’s protection”)
(citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101 (1940)); Richard Fallon, Making Sense of
Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 865-66 (2000) (positing that “political speech and
organization lie at the heart of the First Amendment”).
55. Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1769-77 (2004). To be sure,
some thoughtful academic commentators have questioned this categorical exclusion of sexu-
ally explicit materials from the protection of the First Amendment. See, e.g., Adler, Perverse
Law of Child Pornography, supra note 52, at 210.
56. Schauer, supra note 55, at 1785-88, 1803-07.
57. Again, to reach the proportionality stage of analysis, a litigant must first successfully
argue that the conduct or activity at issue falls within the scope of protection of Article
10—the provision of the European Convention that secures both freedom of expression and
also freedom of the press. See infra notes 101-02 and accompanying text (discussing and
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core political speech, the sort of speech that would automatically
receive the most robust protection under the First Amendment, is
still subject to balancing incident to proportionality analysis. Thus,
no speech is categorically excluded from protection at step one
(scope of coverage analysis), but neither is high value speech, such
as political speech, categorically protected at step two (proportional-
ity analysis).
B. Privacy as a Positive Right
Privacy, like all rights protected under the European Convention,
has both negative and positive aspects. In other words, it is not
sufficient for the state to simply refrain from abridging or denying
protected privacy rights. Instead, the state has an affirmative duty
to secure privacy more generally within society and in interactions
between nongovernmental actors.
X and Y v. The Netherlands provides an instructive example.58 In
this case, a staff member at a facility for persons with developmen-
tal disabilities sexually assaulted a young woman who resided in
the group home.59 The local public prosecutors declined to bring
charges against the staff member accused of the assault, and at that
time, Dutch law did not provide any means for the victim herself to
bring criminal action.60 Had the victim of the assault been legally
competent to bring an action in her own name, a remedy existed
providing the text of Article 10). In general, however, this tends to be easier to do in Europe
than in the United States because finding that the constitutional guarantee applies in the ab-
stract does not necessarily mean that the government will lose (as is quite often the case in
the United States). For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has held that any activity
intended to communicate a message, including even threats of violence, comes within the
scope of section 2(b) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. See R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R.
697, 732-33 (Can.) (“While the line between form and content is not always carefully drawn,
in my opinion threats of violence can only be so classified by reference to the content of their
meaning. As such, they do not fall within the exception spoken of in Irwin Toy, and their
suppression must be justified under s. 1.”); RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM
OF SPEECH 54-55 (2006) (discussing the remarkably broad scope of application of section 2(b)
of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
58. 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 6 (1985).
59. Id. at 8.
60. Id. at 9.
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under Dutch law, but the relevant code provision did not permit the
action to be brought by a parent or guardian on her behalf.61
The young woman and her father filed a complaint with the
ECHR, which concluded that the Netherlands had violated Article
8 of the European Convention by failing to provide sufficient legal
protection for the young woman’s Article 8 privacy rights.62 On these
facts, a violation existed because the right of privacy secured by
Article 8 clearly encompassed “the physical and moral integrity of
the person, including his or her sexual life.”63
Even though the government itself had not violated the peti-
tioner’s right of privacy, a violation nevertheless existed because
[Article 8] does not merely compel the State to abstain from such
interference: in addition to this primarily negative undertaking,
there may be positive obligations inherent in an effective respect
for private or family life. These obligations may involve the
adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life
even in the sphere of the relations of individuals between
themselves.64
On the facts presented, because the Netherlands failed to provide an
effective means of legal redress to the victim of a sexual assault, the
state had failed to discharge its duties under Article 8.65
Nor is X and Y v. The Netherlands an unusual or particularly
novel decision. The concept of drittwirkung, or the obligation of
signatory states to protect fundamental rights generally within
society, is well settled and not particularly controversial.66 As a
leading treatise on the European Convention explains, drittwirkung
61. Id. at 10.
62. Id. at 11-12.
63. Id. at 11, 14. To be sure, the primary focus of Article 8 “is essentially that of protecting
the individual against arbitrary interference by the public authorities.” Id. at 11. But it is not
sufficient for the state simply to refrain from violating European Convention rights, including
the right of privacy set forth in Article 8. Instead, signatories to the European Convention
have an obligation to secure Convention rights more generally within society, including in
contexts involving solely nongovernmental actors.
64. Id. at 11 (citations omitted).
65. See id. at 14.
66. See PIETER VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 28-30 (4th ed. 2006). For a general discussion and overview of the so-called
“horizontal effect” and constitutional rights, see Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect”
of Constitutional Rights, 102 MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003).
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involves “a positive obligation on the part of the Contracting States
to take measures in order to make their exercise possible,”67
including enforcement “vis á vis private third parties.”68
By way of contrast, in the United States, constitutional rights are
almost exclusively negative rights; they bind the state, but have
absolutely no application against nongovernmental entities that do
not meet one of the various tests for state action.69 If fundamental
rights are to apply against nongovernmental actors, positive
legislation at the federal, state, or local level would be requisite.
Moreover, such legislation might itself be constitutionally objection-
able if it has the effect of abridging or denying a fundamental right
held by a regulated entity. For example, under existing Supreme
Court precedent, a state law prohibiting discrimination against gay
and lesbian persons cannot constitutionally be applied to the Boy
Scouts,70 and a law prohibiting discrimination based on race or
ethnicity could not constitutionally be applied to the Ku Klux Klan
or the Nation of Islam.71
The positive aspect of the right of privacy means that the ECHR
(and European domestic courts that observe this doctrine, such as
67. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 66, at 29-30; see DONALD P. KOMMERS, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 48-49, 368 (2d ed.
1997) (discussing the concept of drittwirkung in German constitutional jurisprudence
implementing the Basic Law).
68. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 66, at 30; see ANDREW CLAPHAM, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
PRIVATE SPHERE 179-82 (1996) (discussing the ECHR’s application of human rights obliga-
tions in contexts where state action is absent); Evert Albert Alkema, The Third Party
Applicability or “Drittwirkung” of the ECHR, in PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: THE EUROPEAN
DIMENSION 33-45 (Franz Machter & Herbert Petzold eds., 1988).
69. See Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad., 551 U.S. 291 (2007);
Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Gardbaum, supra note 66, at 388-89, 394-
98, 412-16; see also David P. Currie, Positive and Negative Constitutional Rights, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 864, 864-65, 867-68 (1986) (discussing the paucity of positive rights in the U.S.
constitutional tradition and distinguishing the U.S. approach from the continental approach,
which generally embraces positive constitutional rights); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Back
to the Briarpatch: An Argument in Favor of Constitutional Meta-Analysis in State Action
Determinations, 94 MICH. L. REV. 302 (1995) (providing a comprehensive overview of the state
action doctrine, including its origin and the justifications commonly used to defend it against
criticisms that it creates an arbitrary limit on the scope of application of constitutional rights).
70. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 643-44 (2000); see also JOHN D. INAZU,
LIBERTY’S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012).
71. But see N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988); Roberts v. U.S.
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
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Germany’s Federal Constitutional Court72) looks not only for
government violations of the underlying right but also for govern-
ment failures to sufficiently protect privacy in purely private
contexts. In some instances, a failure to act to protect privacy
against private abridgement would itself constitute a violation of
Article 8(1) of the European Convention.
C. The Scope of Privacy Rights and Mandatory Civility Norms
In European jurisprudence, the right of privacy has a signifi-
cantly broader scope of application than in the contemporary United
States. This observation applies with respect to places (more
protected spaces, including public spaces), persons (less diminution
of privacy rights for public officials, public figures, and persons
involved in matters of public concern than in the United States),
and subjects (personal information deemed worthy of constitutional
protection has a broader scope in Europe).
1. Privacy and Place
In the jurisprudence of the ECHR and many signatory states, a
reasonable expectation of privacy can arise while a person is in
public.73 As the ECHR has explained, “the public does not have a
legitimate interest in knowing where [a person] is and how she
behaves generally in her private life even if she appears in places
that cannot always be described as secluded and despite the fact
that she is well known to the public.”74 In other words, the fact that
72. See KOMMERS, supra note 67, at 48-50; see also Peter E. Quint, Free Speech and
Private Law in German Constitutional Theory, 48 MD. L. REV. 241, 261-64, 271-79 (1989).
73. See, e.g., Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, 2 A.C. 457 (appeal taken from Eng.)
(holding that supermodel Naomi Campbell had a reasonable expectation of privacy with
respect to a photograph of her leaving a narcotics addiction treatment center in central
London, despite the fact that the photograph was taken from a public sidewalk and Campbell
was visible to any member of the public who happened to be passing by); Von Hannover v.
Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 70-73; see also N.A. Moreham, Privacy in Public Places,
65 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 606, 617 (2006) (arguing that under English tort law “it is possible to have
an expectation of privacy in public places”). As Professor Moreham puts it, in defeating a
privacy claim, “[r]ecent decisions in England and in the European Court of Human Rights ...
suggest that it is no longer an answer (if it ever was) simply to say that the disclosure
concerned something which took place in public.” Moreham, supra, at 606.
74. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 72. For a general discussion of the concept of
2015] RECONCILING PRIVACY AND SPEECH 1299
a person is visible to others on a street, sidewalk, or in a park, does
not automatically defeat a privacy claim with respect to a captured
image or photograph. In contrast, in the United States, when a
person voluntarily appears in a public place, she generally will lack
a reasonable expectation of privacy. Moreover, this lack of a
reasonable privacy expectation will usually defeat efforts to seek
legal protection for nondisclosure of the person’s voice, image, or
activity through either the civil or criminal law.
The most famous case involving this principle of being “private
while in public” involved Princess Caroline of Monaco, a subject of
considerable public interest in Germany.75 Princess Caroline ob-
jected to the publication of a series of photographs taken in public
places, such as cafes, charity events, and ski resorts.76 A German
national court prohibited the publication of some of the photographs 
at issue (particularly those featuring Princess Caroline’s children),77
but permitted the publication of others, in large part because
Princess Caroline was a “figure of contemporary society ‘par excel-
lence.’ ”78
The ECHR held that Germany had violated Princess Caroline’s
Article 8 privacy rights, explaining that Article 8(1) mandated a
broader proscription against the publication without permission of
the disputed images of Princess Caroline.79 The ECHR reasoned
that Princess Caroline’s status as a public figure, although relevant
to analyzing her privacy claims, could not be entirely dispositive.
Thus, even for Princess Caroline, “a zone of interaction of a person
with others [exists], even in a public context, which may fall within
the scope of ‘private life.’ ”80
being private in public, see Gavin Phillipson, The “Right” of Privacy in England and Stras-
bourg Compared, in NEW DIMENSIONS IN PRIVACY LAW: INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE
PERSPECTIVES 184, 185-87, 202-05 (Andrew T. Kenyon & Megan Richardson eds., 2006) (dis-
cussing Von Hannover and the concept of privacy while in a public place or space).
75. See Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 47-57 (discussing the factual and proced-
ural background of the litigation in the German domestic courts and also before the ECHR);
see also Moreham, supra note 73, at 607-10 (discussing Von Hannover).
76. Von Hannover, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 48-50.
77. Id. at 52.
78. See id. at 55-57 (discussing the Federal Constitutional Court’s application of the
German public figure doctrine).
79. Id. at 71-73 (holding the German concept of reduced privacy rights for public figures
a violation of Article 8).
80. Id. at 66.
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Although Von Hannover is perhaps the best known ECHR
decision on being “private in public,” other cases also help to estab-
lish the general viability of such claims. A person who attempted
suicide and was filmed on an English city’s closed-circuit television
(CCTV) system, successfully brought an Article 8 privacy claim
against the United Kingdom after the local government released
both photographs and video of the incident to local print and broad-
cast media outlets.81 Peck, the person who attempted suicide, was
unable to obtain legal redress under the British law of breach of
confidence (the United Kingdom’s analogue to the tort of invasion
of privacy in the United States82), and accordingly, filed a complaint
with the ECHR.83
In Peck v. United Kingdom, the ECHR held that the United
Kingdom had violated Peck’s right of privacy and that the govern-
ment lacked a sufficient justification for the breach.84 Although the
use of CCTV systems to monitor public streets and sidewalks in
order to prevent crime constitutes a permissible government policy,
the storage and subsequent distribution of captured images of
Peck’s attempted suicide to the press violated Article 8.85 On these
facts, “the disclosure constituted a disproportionate and therefore
unjustified interference with [Peck’s] private life and a violation of
Art. 8 of the Convention.”86
Similarly, Article 8 interests come into play when government
officials photograph large groups, such as participants in a public
march or demonstration.87 That the entire point of such exercises is
81. See Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 149-51.
82. Moreham, supra note 73, at 606-07, 610-20 (discussing how the tort of breach of
confidence protects a more generalized right of privacy in British law).
83. Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 129, 135-36.
84. See id. at 149-50.
85. See id. at 148-50.
86. Id. at 150.
87. See Friedl v. Austria, 305 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. B) at 20-21 (1995). Although the Austrian
government settled Friedl before the ECHR could render a decision on the merits, the ECHR
has cited with approval the European Commission on Human Right’s decision and opinion
finding that the practice of spying on protestors violated their Article 8 rights. This was so
because “both the storing and release of information relating to an individual’s private life in
a secret police register ... constitute an interference with the person’s right to respect for his
private life.” Id. at 20. Despite the breach of Friedl’s Article 8 rights, because the complainant
was not identified personally in the photographs, and because the Austrian government was
engaged in legitimate law enforcement work, the Commission found that the violation was
authorized by law and demonstrably necessary in a free and democratic society under Article
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to draw public attention and awareness does not automatically de-
feat a privacy claim. This provides some sense of the potential scope
of the concept of being private in public. Even if one participates in
a mass rally or event, the purpose of which is to draw public atten-
tion to a particular cause or movement, Article 8 might still afford
some measure of protection with respect to nondisclosure of your
identity (at least with respect to the state). On the other hand,
establishing a breach, as noted earlier, is not alone sufficient to
obtain relief; a government may always attempt to demonstrate that
the breach is lawful under Article 8(2) by showing that the govern-
ment’s actions were in accordance with the law (that is, prescribed
by law) and demonstrably necessary in a free and democratic society
(proportionality analysis favors the government).88
Even in contexts when harboring any expectation of privacy is
arguably objectively unreasonable, such as in a police station or jail
holding cell, the ECHR has found that Article 8 applies with full
force.89 In PG & JH v. United Kingdom, the ECHR found an unjust-
ified violation of Article 8 when local police in England recorded
without notice or permission the voices of two persons lawfully
arrested and held at the police station.90 Even though the contested
recording took place in a local police station, the court held that “the
recording of the applicants’ voices when being charged and when in
their police cell discloses an interference with their right to respect
for private life within the meaning of Article 8 § 1 of the Conven-
tion.”91 Because British law did not expressly authorize surrepti-
tious recording of persons held after arrest in a local jail, the court
found that the practice was not “in accordance with the law” as re-
quired to save a practice from invalidation under Article 8(2).92
To American eyes, of course, the notion that a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy could exist in a police station or a jail cell borders on
being nonsensical. The European view, however, takes seriously the
notion that all persons, in virtually all contexts, possess a right to
8(2). See id. at 22-23. The key point, however, is that a person can and does possess a
reasonable expectation of privacy while participating in a mass protest rally conducted in a
public park or on a public street or sidewalk.
88. See supra Part I.A.
89. PG & JH v. United Kingdom, 2001-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 195.
90. Id. at 212, 217-19.
91. Id. at 219.
92. Id.
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object to the recording of their image or voice without their knowl-
edge and consent, and also to subsequent distribution of such
recordings. As Professor Moreham has observed, the ECHR’s juris-
prudence clearly establishes that “people are not free ... to publish
images of others simply because they were in a public place at the
time that the image was obtained.”93 Moreover, attempting to de-
fend publication of such images as protected exercises of free speech
or free press rights will not necessarily alter this analysis because
“freedom of expression and public interests will be weak when
information or images are published solely to satisfy readers’ curios-
ity.”94 Instead of a strong baseline that protects a right to publish
images of public officials and public figures, the ECHR has opted for
a baseline that affords even starlets, princesses, and politicians
substantial discretion to decide how much of themselves and their
private lives they wish to make available to the general public.
Finally, one should be careful not to overstate the scope of privacy
protections. To the extent that images or information relate to the
process of democratic self-government and the ability of the citi-
zenry to hold government accountable, privacy protections can and
will give way to the public interest in making the information
generally available.95 However, in U.S. doctrinal terms, the idea
that the press may be more-or-less self-regulating regarding what
constitutes a matter of public concern rings largely, if not entirely,
false in the jurisprudence of the ECHR. In any given case, the
subject of a news story may potentially invoke Article 8 as a basis
for preventing the press from distributing either images or informa-
tion about the person.96
93. Moreham, supra note 73, at 609.
94. Id.
95. See infra Part II.
96. To provide a salient example, the British Royal Family invoked privacy rights
protected under Article 8 in its media relations campaign following the August 2012 public
release of photographs of Prince Harry, third in line to the British crown, cavorting in the
nude with friendly locals in Las Vegas, Nevada. See John F. Burns, Murdoch Defies a Warn-
ing, Exposing Prince Harry, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2012, at A7 (“It took 72 hours, but one of
Britain’s normally scandal-hungry tabloids finally broke ranks on Friday, defying a warning
from palace officials and publishing two photographs of Prince Harry cavorting naked during
a game of strip billiards in his Las Vegas hotel suite.”); Adam Sherwin, Press Warned over
Pictures of Naked Prince, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 23, 2012, at 4 (“St James’s Palace
yesterday asked British media organisations not to publish pictures of a naked Prince Harry
partying in Las Vegas, despite the images being available online.”); see also Nick McAleenen,
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2. Privacy and Persons
Although the status of an individual as a public official or a public
figure affects the balancing exercise between Article 8 (privacy) and
Article 10 (free speech and press) rights, the ECHR has emphati-
cally rejected the notion that public officials and public figures must
forego meaningful privacy protection in order to facilitate public
comment within the marketplace of ideas. All persons enjoy a right
to enjoy respect for privacy in their personal and family life.
Thus, an Estonian woman serving as a senior aide to a govern-
ment ministry enjoyed a right of privacy that encompassed legal
protection from the press using derogatory terms to describe her
adulterous affair with her boss, Edgar Savisaar, a prominent
Estonian politician who served as Estonia’s prime minister and also
as Minister of the Interior.97 So too, Princess Caroline of Monaco,
despite appearing at numerous public events open to the view of
passersby, had a right to be free of unwanted press attention.98 Even
the President of the French Republic, who had actively and
intentionally deceived his constituents regarding his health status,
enjoyed a protected right of privacy under Article 8 after his death.99
Prince Harry - Stripping on the Strip, JMW (Aug. 23, 2012), http://www.jmw.co.uk/blog/prince-
harry-stripping-on-the-strip-983/ [http://perma.cc/4G5A-4JQC] (noting that “Clarence House
has urged the UK media not to republish the pictures to protect Harry’s privacy” and
observing that “publication of photographs of an individual can potentially engage the right
to respect for private life under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”). The
U.S. muckraking website TMZ initially broke the story and provided salacious photographs.
See Prince Harry Naked Photos, TMZ (Aug. 22, 2012) http://www.tmz.com/2012/08/21/prince-
harry-naked-photos-nude-vegas-hotel-party/ [http:// perma.cc/F6HG-GW76]. Under existing
ECHR case law, had Prince Harry sought to block publication of these photographs in the
United Kingdom—or elsewhere in Europe—he probably would have succeeded. To American
eyes, however, it is nothing short of amazing that only one British newspaper—Rupert
Murdoch’s Sun—defied St. James Palace and the British Press Complaints Commission and
published the actual photographs of Prince Harry. See John O’Farrell, The Internet Rushes
in Where Tabloids Fear to Tread, INDEPENDENT (London), Aug. 25, 2012, at 31 (noting that
Murdoch’s Sun was the first, and only, newspaper in the United Kingdom to publish the
photographs). Some British commentary was highly critical of the Sun’s decision to publish
the photographs. See id. (“Most British newspapers made the judgement that because the
photos were taken in a private room without the knowledge of the subject, then the privacy
of that individual should be respected. They made the important distinction between the
public interest and stuff the public is interested in.”).
97. See Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 268-69.
98. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 41, 69-73.
99. Éditions Plon v. France, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 73.
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It would be wrong, however, to conclude that privacy only protects
the rich and the famous. In Egeland & Hanseid v. Norway, two wo-
men who had been convicted for three counts of murder successfully
sued for damages after local newspapers took and published photo-
graphs of them standing outside the court house in which, moments
before, they had been convicted of murder.100 The newspapers
objected that, on the facts presented, Norway had violated their
Article 10 rights to free speech and free press.101
In relevant part, Article 10 of the European Convention states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall
include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart infor-
mation and ideas without interference by public authority and
regardless of frontiers. This Article shall not prevent States from
requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television or cinema
enterprises.102
As with all other provisions of the European Convention, Article 10
also provides a savings clause that mandates proportionality analy-
sis when a court finds a breach of rights secured by Article 10(1):
The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions,
restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are
necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national
security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention
of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for
the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for prevent-
ing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.103
The savings clause thus requires that speech and press regulations
be “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a democratic society” to ad-
vance one of the myriad government interests listed in Article 10(2).
100. Egeland & Hanseid v. Norway, App. No. 34438/04, at 2 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2009),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-92246?TID=qmkpkxtpeu [http://perma.
cc/6TXG-39GD].
101. Id. at 11.
102. European Convention, supra note 10, art. 10(1).
103. Id. art. 10(2).
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It bears noting that protecting “reputation” and “confidences” are
both expressly listed as valid predicates for laws regulating the
exercise of speech and press rights.
Egeland & Hanseid thus presented a square conflict between the
exercise of Article 10 speech and press rights, on the one hand, and,
on the other, privacy rights safeguarded under Article 8. The ECHR
did not find it particularly difficult to resolve this conflict and it did
so decisively in favor of the privacy claim.104 The court rejected the
Article 10 claim, finding that Norway had permissibly weighed and
resolved the subjects’ interest in privacy against the newspapers’
interest in expressive freedom.105
The ECHR reasoned that “[a]lthough the photographs had been
taken in a public place and in relation to a public event ... their
publication represented a particularly intrusive portrayal of B”
because “[s]he had not consented to the taking of the photographs
or to their publication.”106 If anything, the status of an average
citizen as an “ordinary” person enhances, rather than reduces, the
scope of the right of privacy secured under the European Conven-
tion. The public might have a right to know about the existence of
criminal proceedings, and also their resolution, but this does not
mean that the public has a right to see the actual image of the
accused during an unguarded moment in the print media.
In sum, in the United States, it would be unthinkable to obtain
an injunction against the distribution of a book describing an
active—and largely successful—campaign to deceive the public
regarding the President’s health, that the heir to a hereditary
monarchy could object to reporting on her public activities (accom-
panied by lawfully obtained photographs), or that convicted felons
could prevent publication of their images in local newspapers
incident to coverage of the trial proceedings and outcome. In
Europe, however, a different metric applies to accommodating the
rights of speech and press, on the one hand, and the right of privacy,
on the other. Absent a clear need premised on a narrowly defined
concept of “the public interest,” the public does not enjoy a general-
ized right of access to particular information or personal images; in
104. Egeland & Hanseid, App. No. 34438/04 at 19-20.
105. Id.
106. Id.
1306 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1279
many cases, privacy claims can and will trump speech and press
claims.
3. Privacy and the Potential Scope of Protected Materials
The scope of constitutionally protected information is consider-
ably broader in Europe than in the United States. For example,
persons facing criminal charges have successfully sought and
obtained injunctions against publication of their photographs—even
when the photographs were taken incident to the arrest process and
while the criminal charges were pending.107 Thus, as a general
matter, “publication of photographs” comes within the scope of
protected “private life.” Moreover, the ECHR also has sustained
mandatory civility norms that prohibit the public use of insulting or
opprobrious language because these rules advance privacy interests
rooted in Article 8(1).108
a. The Right to Control One’s Image and Personal Data
The ECHR has recognized a broad right to control one’s image
and personal data—even when a public record is involved or the
information relates to a matter of public concern (or both). For
example, in Sciacca v. Italy, the ECHR upheld an Article 8 claim
when local police in Sicily released an arrest photograph without
the subject’s express permission.109 The local revenue police took a
photograph of Sciacca incident to her arrest “on charges of criminal
association, tax evasion, and forgery.”110 The public prosecutor and
revenue police held a joint press conference about the case; incident
to this event, the police released a copy of Sciacca’s arrest photo-
graph to media, which proceeded to publish Sciacca’s photograph in
local news stories reporting on the criminal proceedings.111 Sciacca’s
arrest photograph appeared “four times, on December 5 and 6,
107. See, e.g., Sciacca v. Italy, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 59, 68.
108. See Tammer v. Estonia, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 263.
109. Sciacca, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66-69.
110. Id. at 64.
111. Id. at 64-65.
2015] RECONCILING PRIVACY AND SPEECH 1307
1998.”112 In each instance, the newspapers sourced the photograph
from the revenue police.113
The ECHR had no theoretical or practical qualms about holding
that Sciacca had properly invoked her privacy rights under Article
8: “Regarding whether there has been an interference, the Court
reiterates that the concept of private life includes elements relating
to a person’s right to their picture and that publication of a photo-
graph falls within the scope of private life.”114 Moreover, the fact
that Sciacca was involved in pending criminal charges—plainly a
matter of public concern under U.S. law—did not alter this basic
analysis: “[T]he fact that the applicant was the subject of criminal
proceedings cannot curtain the scope of such protection.”115
To be sure, the ECHR noted that “[t]he present case differs from
previous ones in that the applicant [Sciacca] was not someone who
featured in a public context (public figure or politician) but the
subject of criminal proceedings.”116 This factor, however, cut against
the ability of the print media to publish the photograph. As the
ECHR explains, Sciacca’s “status as an ‘ordinary person’ enlarges
the zone of interaction which may fall within the scope of private
life.”117 Thus, the revenue police’s decision to release Sciacca’s
photograph constituted a breach of the right of privacy secured
under Article 8.118
By way of contrast, in the United States, an adult accused of
criminal wrongdoing would not succeed in raising a legal objection
112. Id. at 65.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 68-69.
115. Id. at 68-69. It bears noting that the release of the photograph was not governed by
any law or regulation; accordingly, the burden on Sciacca’s privacy interests was not “in
accordance with the law,” a prerequisite to a successful defense of a law or policy that burdens
a European Convention right. See id. at 69. However, even if a formal law or regulation
authorized the release of the photograph by the police, Sciacca might well still have prevailed
based on a proportionality analysis. See supra notes 100-06 and accompanying text (discus-
sing the ECHR’s Egeland & Hanseid decision, which held that Article 8 required legal
protection against publication of a post-conviction photograph taken on court house steps).
116. Sciacca, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 68.
117. Id. Because Italian law did not regulate the release of mug shots, the release of
Sciacca’s photograph was not “in accordance with the law.” See id. Mere administrative
“practice” does not satisfy Article 8(2). See id. (holding that “the Court considers that the
subject-matter was not governed by a ‘law’ that satisfied the criteria laid down by the Court’s
case law, but rather by practice”).
118. Id. at 69 (finding “there has been a breach” of Sciacca’s privacy rights under Article 8).
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to the release and subsequent publication of an arrest photograph
or “mug shot.” In fact, popular entertainment web sites, such as
TMZ, routinely publish particularly embarrassing celebrity mug
shots to help generate traffic.119 The idea that a person arrested for
a criminal act could successfully assert a privacy claim against pub-
lication of a mug shot simply would not occur to most U.S. lawyers,
judges, or law professors. Yet, the analysis in Europe is quite
different because of the robust scope and strength of constitutional
privacy protections. Even regarding a matter of public concern—
pending criminal charges for tax evasion—the accused enjoys a
right of privacy that must be balanced against the right of the press
to report truthfully on the criminal proceedings.120
In general, European privacy law protects the ability of individu-
als to control the use and publication of their image and voice,
personal data and information (such as medical records), and also
information about personal activities and interests.121 The ECHR
has explained that “the protection of personal data [is] of fundamen-
tal importance to a person’s enjoyment of his or her right to respect
for private life and ... domestic law must therefore afford appropri-
ate safeguards to prevent any such disclosure as may be inconsis-
tent with Article 8 of the Convention.”122 Moreover, “[s]uch interfer-
ence [with privacy] could not be compatible with Article 8 of the
119. See Clifford S. Fishman, Technology and the Internet: The Impending Destruction of
Privacy by Betrayers, Grudgers, Snoops, Spammers, Corporations, and the Media, 72 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 1503, 1515 n.48 (2004) (noting the high public interest in particularly unfortu-
nate celebrity mug shots, including those of Michael Jackson, Nick Nolte, Paul Reubens, and
Hugh Grant and observing that “[t]hanks to the Internet, mug shots of the famous or
notorious are now also popular entertainment”); Celebrity News: Lohan Finally Checks into
Rehab, Witherspoon Pleads No Contest, BOS. GLOBE, May 4, 2013, at B12 (reporting on TMZ’s
release of a live video of actress Reese Witherspoon’s arrest for DUI in Atlanta, Georgia); see
also Karen Crouse, More Relaxed, Phelps Is Ready to Resume His Duel with Lochte, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2012, at D1 (reporting on an unfortunate promotional picture released by
swimmer Michael Phelps and suggesting that “[i]t may be the most unflattering mug shot
since a wild-haired Nick Nolte was caught on camera after a 2002 arrest”).
120. See generally Sciacca, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H. R. 59.
121. See Hachette Filipacchi Associés v. France, App. No. 71111/01, at 11 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2007), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-81066?TID=munkcduuhz [http://
perma.cc/CTT7-KGR6] (disallowing publication of photographs of a murder victim because
“certain events in the life of a family must be given particularly careful protection”).
122. Peck v. United Kingdom, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 123, 147-48; see Z. v. Finland, App. No.
22009/93, 25 Eur. H.R. Rep. 371, 406-07 (1998) (holding that involuntary release of medical
records in open court violates Article 8).
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Convention unless it was justified by an overriding requirement in
the public interest.”123
b. Mandatory Civility Norms Limiting the Use of
Opprobrious or Insulting Language in Public
Just as the ECHR has protected the ability of individuals to
protect (control) the use of their images, voice, and personal data, it
also has upheld laws that protect the ways in which individuals are
presented to the general public in the press. Tammer v. Estonia
provides an excellent example of this principle in action.124
Tammer involved news stories, drawn from interviews under-
taken on a voluntary basis in anticipation of publication of Vilja
Laanaru’s tell-all memoir.125 However, Laanaru abandoned the
project after reconciling with her lover (and later husband) Edgar
Saavisar.126 The news stories used disparaging language to describe
Laanaru,127 a person highly active in Estonian politics.128 Without
Laanaru’s permission, an Estonian newspaper published excerpts
from these interviews, including questions and answers that
described her as an abielul?hkuja (or homewrecker) and as a
rongaema (poor/irresponsible parent).129
Neither term, in Estonian usage, is particularly blue or scatologi-
cal. The word for divorce in Estonian is abielu lahutamine and
abielul?hkuja used literally means a person who brings about the
dissolution of a marriage.130 Estonian government websites on how
to obtain a divorce use the root word repeatedly (and presumably
without causing offense to those perusing the content).131 In fact,
incident to the Tammer litigation, the Estonian Supreme Court’s
criminal division directly acknowledged that “the words ‘rongaema’
123. Peck, 2003-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 148.
124. 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 263, 266.
125. Id. at 268.
126. Id. at 268-69.
127. Id. at 268-69 (providing the factual setting for Tammer).
128. Id. at 268.
129. Id. at 265, 269.
130. Id. at 270.
131. Abielu Lahutamine, EESTI, https://www.eesti.ee/est/abielu_lahutamine [http://perma.
cc/98PS-ZNJN] (last visited Mar. 22, 2015). For a translated version, see Divorcing a Mar-
riage, EESTI, https://www. eesti.ee/eng/abielu_ lahutamine [http://perma.cc/KE9F-TH6U] (last
visited Mar. 22, 2015).
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and ‘abielul?hkuja’ are not vulgar or indecent,”132 but nevertheless
held that their use in referring to someone could be “considered as
degrading that person’s honour and dignity in an improper man-
ner,” the gravamen of a legal claim for personal insult under Eston-
ian law.133
It bears noting that Ms. Laanaru was active in Estonian politics
and worked as an aide for Edgar Savisaar, both during his tenure
as Prime Minister of Estonia, and later, Minister of the Interior.134
During her period of employment with Savisaar, they maintained
a long-term adulterous affair.135 Ultimately, Savisaar divorced his
wife and married Laanaru—at which point Laanaru abandoned her
plans to publish a tell-all memoir.136 After Laanaru withdrew her
support for the book, Ülo Russak, the journalist who was assisting
Laanaru with her memoirs, decided to publish excerpts of their
interviews in the daily newspaper Eesti Päevaleht.137
Following publication of the interview excerpts, Laanaru sued the
newspaper, naming Enno Tammer, its editor, as the defendant.138
She alleged a violation of Article 130 of the Estonian Criminal Code,
which provides that “[t]he degradation of another person’s honour
and dignity in an improper form shall be punished with a fine or
detention.”139 Essentially, Article 130 prohibits the publication of in-
sults. Laanaru prevailed in the Estonian trial and appellate courts;
the courts fined Tammer 220 kroons, or “ten times the ‘daily income’
rate.”140
On appeal, the Estonian Supreme Court sustained Tammer’s con-
viction and held that use of the disputed adjectives could support a
132. Tammer, 2001-I Eur. Ct. H.R. at 272.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 268.
135. Id. at 267.
136. Id. at 268-69.
137. Id. at 269.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 274 (citing Article 130 of the Estonian Criminal Code).
140. Id. at 270. The maximum potential fine was considerably higher: 
A fine is a penalty which the court can impose up to a limit of nine hundred
times a person’s daily income. The “daily income” rate is calculated on the basis
of the average daily wage of the defendant following deduction of taxes and
taking into account his or her family and financial status.
Id. at 274 (quoting Article 28 of the Estonian Criminal Code).
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legal claim under Article 130.141 The court explained that “[i]m-
proper form as a legal category within the meaning of Article 130 of
the Criminal Code does not only include the use of vulgar or inde-
cent words, but also the use of negative and defamatory figurative
expressions.”142 The Estonian Supreme Court found that Lanaaru’s
interest in her personal dignity outweighed a journalist’s interest in
using these particular words as adjectives to describe her in a news
story.143
After losing before Estonia’s domestic courts, Tammer initiated
a case before the ECHR, arguing that his rights under Article 10
had been violated.144 The ECHR easily found an abridgement of Art-
icle 10’s protection of speech and press freedoms;145 it also readily
found that the burden was “prescribed by law” in Article 130 of the
Estonian Criminal Code,146 and that the law in question furthered
a legitimate government purpose (namely, protection of personal
honor and reputation).147 The outcome of the case then turned on
proportionality analysis—whether Article 130, as applied on the
facts at bar, constituted a reasonable accommodation of speech and
press rights and personal privacy.
The ECHR offered many sympathetic observations about the
centrality of free expression to democratic self-government, but
nevertheless sustained Tammer’s conviction.148 Even though “free-
dom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society and one of the basic conditions for its progress
and each individual’s self-fulfillment,”149 and “in a democratic soci-
ety” the press performs an “essential function,”150 the ECHR found
141. Id. at 270, 282.
142. Id. at 272.
143. See id. at 273, 281-82. (“Any objective circumstances inherent in the functioning of the
press—such as consideration of newspaper space and information density, according to the
appellant—being values whose scope is limited to a particular sphere, cannot be compared to
such values as human dignity.”).
144. Id. at 274.
145. See id.
146. Id. at 275. The ECHR did express some misgivings about the broad and general
wording of Article 130, but nevertheless held that “the statutory provision cannot be regarded
as so vague and imprecise as to lack the quality of ‘law.’” Id. at 275.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 279-82.
149. Id. at 279.
150. Id. at 280.
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that “[i]n the context of freedom of the press, the requirements of
such protection have to be weighed in relation to the interest of the
applicant as a journalist in imparting information and ideas on
matters of public concern.”151 On the facts at issue, Tammer’s news-
paper published negative “value judgments” about Laanaru, using
language that “was not necessary.”152 In the court’s view, Tammer
“could have formulated his criticism of Ms. Laanaru’s actions
without resorting to such insulting expressions.”153 According to the
ECHR, Laanaru’s “private life” was not really a matter of public
concern, nor did it bear upon “a matter of general importance.”154 On
these facts, “[t]he interference with [Tammer’s] right to freedom of
expression could thus reasonably be considered necessary in a dem-
ocratic society for the protection of the reputation or rights of others
within the meaning of Article 10 § 2 of the Convention.”155
Thus, a newspaper was not free to use words that characterize
Laanaru as a home wrecker and a bad parent because these matters
did not relate to her official duties with her boss, Savisaar. Nor did
her status as a person active in Estonian politics make her private
life a matter of public concern. Essentially, the ECHR holds that
even a person holding important government positions, and active
in politics, has a right to demand privacy with respect to her
personal life. The imposition of a more severe punishment might
have altered this legal conclusion, but the fact that Estonian law
permitted the imposition of any liability (particularly when the
potential maximum fine was almost three years net wages) ought to
give a reasonable observer pause. One could also make the case that
a high ranking government official conducting an affair with a
subordinate does in fact relate to a matter of public concern, given
the obvious risk that such relationships might not be entirely
consensual.
In the United States, it would be unthinkable that such reporting
could be made the subject of civil or criminal liability. In fact, the
Supreme Court has squarely rejected the idea that mandatory
civility norms may be imposed—Cohen v. California stands for the
151. Id. at 281.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 282.
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proposition that government may not attempt to control the manner
in which one seeks to express an idea.156 Moreover, Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc., v. Falwell holds that with respect to a public figure (like
Ms. Laanaru), targeted efforts to humiliate or embarrass cannot
constitutionally be punished—at least in the absence of an inten-
tional or reckless false statement of fact about the subject.157
In other words, in the United States, legal efforts to mandate
civility are generally inconsistent with the First Amendment.158 The
Supreme Court has expressly, and repeatedly, held that the govern-
ment cannot punish or restrict the use of opprobrious language even
when used in public meetings or to law enforcement officers.159 As
Professor Whitman astutely notes, “To say that America has
absolutely no law of civility is to say too much. But to say that in
general America has no law of civility—especially as compared with
a country like Germany—is to make the right generalization.”160
* * * 
The scope of protected privacy has obvious and immediate effects
on the scope of speech and press rights in Europe. First, as the
preceding discussion demonstrates, the scope of protected privacy
interests is significantly broader in Europe than in the contempo-
rary United States. In myriad contexts, the ECHR has found that
applicants have successfully claimed a privacy interest in circum-
stances in which no viable privacy claim would exist under contem-
porary U.S. law. The broader scope of privacy rights in European
jurisprudence thus creates more potential for privacy and speech to
come into conflict with each other. Second, when such conflicts arise,
neither right enjoys an absolute priority. Rather, the ECHR
reconciles Article 8 and Article 10 claims on a case-by-case, context-
specific basis in order to ascertain which right should take prece-
dence on a given set of facts. Third, and finally, in many cases this
balancing exercise has reliably favored privacy claims over speech
156. 403 U.S. 15, 25-26 (1971).
157. 485 U.S. 46, 52-55 (1988).
158. See Whitman, supra note 33, at 1285, 1319-21, 1358-59, 1387.
159. See Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Polysemy of Privacy, 88 IND. L.J. 881, 889 n.40
(2013).
160. Whitman, supra note 33, at 1384.
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and press rights even in cases brought by public officials, public
figures, and persons involved in matters of public of public concern.
The ECHR’s decisions make very plain that the press does not
enjoy the freedom to decide for itself when publication of materials
falling within the scope of Article 8’s protection advances a suffi-
ciently important public interest to justify intruding on the subject’s
privacy; although, as the next section will show, the ECHR appreci-
ates the essential nexus between free speech and press rights and
the project of democratic self-government. Indeed European judges
tend to look favorably on statutes and regulations that set the metes
and bounds of reasonable reportage. Only when a court concludes
that a law or regulation unduly impedes the ability of the press to
report on matters of public concern will free expression and freedom
of the press take precedence over securing privacy, dignity, and
personal honor. And without doubt, this balancing approach produc-
es a significant chilling effect on press reportage regarding public
officials, public figures, and persons involved in matters of public
concern.
In sum, the standard account—which posits that privacy
generally enjoys priority over speech and press rights in Eu-
rope—provides a reasonably accurate portrait of how European
human rights law prioritizes these constitutional rights. The ECHR
has given privacy a broad scope of application and also has insisted
that signatory states enact effective legal protection for materials
that fall within the zone of constitutional privacy.161 Because of the
broader scope of protected privacy interests in Europe, and the
positive obligation of national governments to secure privacy within
their jurisdictions, privacy protection in Europe would appear to be
significantly more secure than in the contemporary United States.
At the same time, however, the broader scope of privacy rights has
direct, and quite negative, implications for the scope and vigor of
expressive freedom (including both speech and press rights).
161. To be sure, such protections exist in the United States, but as a general matter the
creation of privacy rights in the United States arises primarily by operation of statute and not
by operation of the Constitution itself (save for claims involving police searches and seizures,
which come within the scope of the Fourth Amendment). See U.S. CONST. amend IV. Data
protection, for example, against both private and governmental entities, is largely a question
left for legislatures to address—or ignore—as they see fit. In Europe, by way of contrast,
governments have not merely the discretion to protect privacy interests; they instead have
a duty to take such action.
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II. IMPORTANT SHARED VALUES EXIST BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE CONCERNING BOTH PRIVACY AND SPEECH
Not withstanding the significant differences that exist between
the European and American understandings of constitutional
privacy, one would be mistaken to conclude that the right of privacy
in Europe bears little, if any, relationship to its scrawnier American
cousin. To be sure, and as the preceding Part demonstrated, privacy
enjoys a broader scope of application in both European human
rights theory and practice. Nevertheless, important points of agree-
ment exist between the privacy law of the United States and
Europe, including (1) the core notion that free speech and press
rights cannot be completely subordinated to privacy rights and (2)
that public officials, public figures, and persons involved in matters
of public concern hold diminished privacy rights because of the im-
perative of permitting information necessary to facilitate the project
of democratic self-government to circulate freely within society.
The ECHR’s recent Axel Springer decision demonstrates quite
clearly that privacy claims by celebrities do not routinely, or
automatically, displace claims rooted in expressive freedoms,
including speech and press rights. The case involved Bruno
Eyron,162 a German actor who portrayed a police superintendent
(Kriminalhauptkommissar Stefan Balko) on Balko, a popular
German television police drama.163 At the 2004 Munich Oktoberfest,
Eyron (consistently referred to as “X” in the ECHR’s published
decision), was arrested for possession of cocaine upon leaving a
public toilet at the festival.164 The German daily newspaper Bild
published a story on September 29 reporting that “[h]e came out of
162. See German Papers Win Paparazzi Case in Europe, LOCALDE (Feb. 8, 2012),
http://www.thelocal.de/20120208/40599 [http://perma.cc/U8GF-LFFA] (“While the court did
not name the actor, Bild, a tabloid owned by the Axel Springer group, had published articles
concerning Bruno Eyron’s arrest for drug possession.”).
163. Axel Springer AG v. Germany, App. No. 39954/08, at 3 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-109034?TID=qsritlgqxa [http://perma.cc/
A6JU-T9AK] (“By October 2004, 103 episodes had been broadcast, the last 54 of which had
starred X in the role of Superintendent Y.”). The program enjoyed a significant viewership.
See id.
164. Id. at 4.
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the gents tapping his nose suspiciously and was arrested!”165 The
story proceeded to provide a factually accurate account of the actor’s
arrest for possession of 0.23 grams of cocaine; it also included the
actor’s photograph.166
The actor sought and obtained an injunction against republication
of the article reporting on his arrest; the Hamburg Regional Court
held:
[T]he article in question, which mentioned X’s name and was
accompanied by photos of him, amounted to a serious interfer-
ence with his right to the protection of his personality rights; the
disclosure of his criminal conduct had, so to speak, resulted in
his being pilloried and discredited in the eyes of the public.167
On the facts presented, “X’s personality rights prevailed over the
public’s interest in being informed, even if the truth of the facts
related by the daily had not been disputed.”168 Thus, the German
domestic courts weighed the relative importance of an actor’s right
to be free of truthful, but embarrassing, media coverage against a
major daily newspaper’s right to publish information about the fact
of an arrest and public prosecution, and found that the actor’s inter-
est in privacy took precedence over the rights of speech and press.
The ECHR, however, emphatically rejected this accommodation
of the competing interests, ruling that as a public figure involved in
a public criminal proceeding, the actor’s interest in personal privacy
had to give way to the public’s interest in receiving this information.
The majority explained that “the Court considers that there is no
reasonable relationship of proportionality between, on the one hand,
the restrictions imposed by the national courts on the applicant
company’s right to freedom of expression and, on the other hand, the
legitimate aim pursued.”169 Although the German courts had not
imposed a significant fine and had merely enjoined further coverage
of the actor’s arrest, “the Court considers that, although these were
165. Id. at 3.
166. Id. at 5.
167. Id. at 6-7.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 34.
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lenient, they were capable of having a chilling effect on the appli-
cant company.”170
Along similar lines, in Éditions Plon v. France, the ECHR rejected
a permanent injunction against the distribution of a book, entitled
Le Grand Secret, authored by Dr. Claude Gubler, a private physi-
cian, and Michel Gonod, a French journalist.171 The book detailed
French President François Mitterand’s treatment for cancer, with
particular attention to Dr. Gubler’s role in treating the French
Republic’s president.172 President Mitterand died on January 8,
1996, and shortly thereafter Le Monde published a series of articles
suggesting the President Mitterand’s medical treatment for cancer
had been professionally inappropriate.173 Although Dr. Gubler and
Gonod initially planned to refrain from publishing Le Grand Secret
until some months after Mitterand’s death, the media scrutiny and
the implication that Dr. Gubler’s treatment was ineffective and
nonstandard led them to accelerate public release of the book.174
Under the revised marketing plan, Le Grand Secret was to be
released to the public on January 17, 1996; however, President
Mitterand’s surviving widow and children immediately sought an
injunction against the book’s release.175 Their complaint alleged
“breach of medical confidentiality [and] an invasion of President
Mitterand’s privacy and injury to his relatives’ feelings.”176 The trial
court issued an injunction on an emergency basis on January 18,
1996, imposing a penalty of 1000 francs per book distributed.177 The
court explained that “[a]ll people, regardless of their rank, birth or
function, have the right to respect for their private life.”178 The Paris
Court of Appeal upheld the injunction on March 13, 1996, and the
Court of Cassation dismissed Dr. Gubler’s subsequent appeal on
July 16, 1997.179 Both appellate courts found that the book consti-
tuted an invasion of Mitterand’s privacy and a breach of medical
170. Id.
171. 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 39, 46.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 47.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 48-49.
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confidentiality.180 Subsequent civil proceedings resulted in a judg-
ment of 180,000 francs against the authors and publisher, payable
to Mrs. Mitterand and her children, and established a permanent
ban on distribution of the book.181 Having exhausted its appeals
within the French judicial system, Éditions Plon filed a complaint
with the ECHR, alleging that the injunction and damages award
violated Article 10 by unduly abridging the freedom of speech and
the press.182
The ECHR rejected the reasoning of the French domestic courts
and concluded:
[T]he book was published in the context of a wide-ranging debate
in France on a matter of public interest, in particular the pub-
lic’s right to be informed about any serious illnesses suffered by
the head of State, and the question whether a person who knew
that he was seriously ill was fit to hold the highest national
office.183
Given that Mitterand was a public official and the matter of his
health was clearly a matter of public concern, “the French authori-
ties had only a limited margin of appreciation to decide whether
there was a ‘pressing social need’ to take the measures in question
against the applicant company.”184 In other words, in this specific
context, a strong presumption in favor of a right to publish existed
and the French government had to meet a particularly high burden
in order to justify the permanent censorship of the book.185
The ECHR sustained the imposition of money damages and a
temporary injunction as an appropriate legal remedy for the breach
of medical confidence because these measures were “based on
relevant and sufficient reasons in the instant case.”186 However, as
time passed, and “as the President’s death became more distant in
time,”187 the Mitterand family’s privacy interest diminished, and the
180. Id.
181. Id. at 50.
182. Id. at 54-55.
183. Id. at 68-69.
184. Id. at 69.
185. Id. at 67, 69.
186. Id. at 71.
187. Id. at 72.
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public’s interest in a fully informed discussion of the underlying
policy issues increased. This did not, perforce, wipe out the breach
of confidence. However, the court reasoned that
once the duty of confidentiality has been breached, giving rise to
criminal (and disciplinary) sanctions against the person respon-
sible, the passage of time must be taken into account in assess-
ing whether such a serious measure as banning a book—a
measure which in the instant case was likewise general and
absolute—was compatible with freedom of expression.188
The ECHR also thought it relevant that some 40,000 copies of the
book had entered public circulation and that its content “had also
been disseminated on the Internet and had been the subject of
considerable media comment.”189 By October 1996, when the trial
court issued its final judgment in the civil liability action, the ECHR
found that the “pressing social need” no longer justified the ban on
distribution of the book.190
This kind of balancing certainly reflects greater solicitude for the
Mitterand family’s interest in protecting their privacy and preserv-
ing the confidentiality of President Mitterand’s medical history than
would be the case in the United States. But it would be quite wrong
to suggest that the ECHR’s resolution of the case disregards the
central importance of President Mitterand’s status as a public
official or the fact that his efforts to mislead the public about his
health while in office constituted an important matter of public
concern.
Similarly, the ECHR has declined to vindicate the privacy inter-
ests of a politician accused of criminal wrongdoing191 or criminal
defendants accused of waging a terrorism campaign.192 With respect
to Walter Posch, an Austrian politician who objected to the use of
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 73.
191. See Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG v. Austria, App. No. 34315/96, at 2 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
2002), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-60173?TID=cvwviinnez [http://
perma.cc/D8BH-PSZ4].
192. See News Verlags GmbH & CoKG v. Austria, 2000-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 157, 159-60, 164
(holding that an injunction against publication of the picture of an accused Nazi allegedly
involved in a letter bomb campaign in Austria violated Article 10).
1320 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 56:1279
his likeness in a negative newspaper story covering the allegations
of official wrongdoing, the ECHR in Krone Verlag GmbH & Co. KG
v. Austria explained that “there is little scope for restrictions on
political speech or questions of public interest.”193 Moreover, the
court continued:
The limits of acceptable criticism are wider with regard to a
politician acting in his public capacity than in relation to a
private individual, as the former inevitably and knowingly lays
himself open to close scrutiny of his every word and deed by both
journalists and the public at large, and he must display a
greater degree of tolerance. A politician is certainly entitled to
have his reputation protected, even when he is not acting in his
private capacity, but the requirements of that protection have to
be weighed against the interests of the open discussion of
political issues.194
In the case at bar, the allegations related to “a matter of public
concern which does not fall wholly within his private sphere.”195
Having “entered the public arena,” as an active politician holding
office, Posch “had to bear the consequences thereof,” which included
publication of his picture in conjunction with a news story detailing
the allegations of official wrongdoing.196
Although an ordinary person might successfully object to the
release of a mug shot and its subsequent publication in a local
newspaper,197 an incumbent politician accused of criminal wrong-
doing has a diminished claim on privacy and the press has an
enhanced claim on its Article 10 right to report truthful information
to the public. When the information directly relates to the ability
of the public to participate in the project of democratic self-govern-
ment, as was arguably the case in Krone Verlag, the appropriate
balance strongly skews toward Article 10 and away from Article 8.198
193. Krone Verlag GmbH & Co., App. No. 34315/96, at 7.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 7-8.
196. Id. at 8. (“Thus, there is no valid reason why the applicant company should be
prevented from publishing [Posch’s] picture.”).
197. See Sciacca v. Italy, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 59.
198. See Krone Verlag GmbH & Co., App. No. 34315/96, at 7-8 (“What counts is whether
this person has entered the public arena.”). Examples of voluntarily entering the public arena
include holding public office or discharging public functions, participating in a public debate,
2015] RECONCILING PRIVACY AND SPEECH 1321
In sum, a truthful allegation of official wrongdoing by a person hold-
ing government office presents perhaps the clearest instance of facts
that will justify giving Article 10 speech and press rights an
absolute priority over Article 8’s protection of privacy. Even if the
concept of being a public officer or a public figure does not sweep as
broadly in Europe as in the United States, public officer or public
figure status is highly relevant in assessing a person’s reasonable
expectation of privacy vis á vis the press.
Moreover, the notion that a free press is essential to the function-
ing of a democratic polity also animates the ECHR’s Article 10
decisions. The press engages in an “essential function ... in a demo-
cratic society,” and it has a “duty to impart information and ideas on
all matters of public interest.”199 Thus, a politician’s interest in
privacy and nondisclosure will not preclude the press from publish-
ing his image in a story covering alleged official wrongdoing.200
The overwhelmingly press-friendly baseline established in New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan clearly does not apply in the jurispru-
dence of the ECHR;201 nevertheless, common ground plainly exists
and directly relates to Meiklejohn’s democratic deliberation theory
of the freedom of speech.202 To the extent that speech is demonstra-
bly necessary to facilitate the project of democratic self-governance,
privacy protections can and do give way in Europe just as they do in
the United States.
To be sure, the U.S. approach is more categorical and generally
confers broader protection on speech and press rights. For public
officials and public figures in the United States, the imperatives of
the First Amendment largely preclude meaningful privacy protect-
ions even when information demonstrably relates to a subject’s
private life, as opposed to public life. Indeed, even for private figures
becoming active in a field of public concern, entering public discussions, or committing
political offenses. See id. It also bears noting that the reportage at issue in Krone Verlag did
not relate to Mr. Posch’s private life. The ECHR explained that it “attaches particular
importance to the fact that the published photographs did not disclose any details of [Posch’s]
private life.” Id.
199. Id. at 8.
200. See id. (“In view of Mr. Posch’s position as a politician there is no doubt that he had
entered the public arena and had to bear the consequences thereof.”).
201. See generally N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
202. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 22-28, 88-89, 91; Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York
Times Case: A Note on “the Central Meaning of the First Amendment,” 1964 SUP. CT. REV. 191,
204, 209-10, 220-21.
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involved in a matter of public concern, privacy protections will
generally give way to facilitating expressive freedoms.203 But, for a
private person or entity in the absence of a matter of public concern,
statutory or common law privacy protections may be conveyed
without running afoul of constitutional limitations.204
In the United States, under the First Amendment, “one man’s
vulgarity is another’s lyric.”205 U.S. constitutional law reflects the
view that if the federal or state governments could adopt mandatory
civility rules, they “might soon seize upon the censorship of partic-
ular words as a convenient guise for banning the expression of
unpopular views.”206
Nor may federal or state laws seek to protect personal honor,
reputation, or dignity, at least with respect to public officials, public
figures, and persons involved in matters of public concern—even
scandalous and outrageously offensive parody enjoys full constitu-
tional protection.207 As Chief Justice Rehnquist explained in Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell: “At the heart of the First Amendment is
the recognition of the fundamental importance of the free flow of
ideas and opinions on matters of public interest and concern.”208
This, in turn, means that even when a parody seeks to vilify its
subject, the bad motive of a speaker cannot be used to justify the
imposition of civil liability in the United States.209 The imperative
of protecting speech strictly limits the potential scope of both civil
and criminal provisions aimed at promoting personal honor, dignity,
and civility.210
203. See Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207 (2011); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
204. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
205. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971).
206. Id. at 26.
207. See Snyder, 131 S. Ct. at 1215-18; Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51-
52 (1988).
208. 485 U.S. at 50.
209. See id. at 53 (“Thus while such a bad motive may be deemed controlling for purposes
of tort liability in other areas of the law, we think the First Amendment prohibits such a
result in the area of public debate about public figures.”).
210. See Cohen, 403 U.S. at 26 (holding that “we cannot indulge the facile assumption that
one can forbid particular words without also running a substantial risk of suppressing ideas
in the process”). Justice Harlan explains that “because governmental officials cannot make
principled distinctions in this area,” the First Amendment requires that government leave
“matters of taste and style ... largely to the individual.” Id. at 25. For a general discussion of
Cohen and its centrality to U.S. free speech theory and practice, see Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
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In sum, in the United States, “government must remain neutral
in the marketplace of ideas.”211 And it must do so even in circum-
stances when speech imposes significant emotional costs. Moreover,
“[u]nder the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false
idea,”212 and “[h]owever pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend
for its correction not on the conscience of judges and juries but on
the competition of other ideas.”213 This absolutist approach to
protecting free speech results, to European eyes at least, in an
unsuitably low level of protection for privacy rights.
Coming at the issue from the opposite direction, however, the
First Amendment has given way to privacy concerns, at least in
some contexts. The Supreme Court has sustained proscriptions
against fixed pickets of personal residences, citing the government’s
interest in safeguarding privacy in the home.214 As Justice O’Connor
explained, “One important aspect of residential privacy is protection
of the unwilling listener.”215 In sustaining a ban on targeted resi-
dential pickets, she explained that a targeted picket “inherently and
offensively intrudes on residential privacy” and produces a “devas-
tating effect ... on the quiet enjoyment of the home.”216
For similar reasons, the Supreme Court also has sustained
ordinances aimed at protecting the privacy of clinic personnel and
patients seeking to enter and leave family planning clinics.217
Writing for the Hill v. Colorado majority, Justice Stevens explained
that “[t]he unwilling listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted com-
munication has been repeatedly identified in our cases”218 and
constitutes “an aspect of the broader ‘right to be let alone’ that one
of our wisest Justices characterized as ‘the most comprehensive of
Jr., Cohen v. California: “Inconsequential” Cases and Larger Principles, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1251
(1996).
211. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745-46 (1978).
212. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974).
213. Id. at 339-40.
214. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
215. Id. at 484.
216. Id. at 486.
217. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703 (2000). But cf. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518,
2537-41 (2014) (invalidating a Massachusetts law that adopted broader proscriptions against
pickets of abortion service providers as insufficiently tailored to pass First Amendment
review).
218. Hill, 530 U.S. at 716.
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rights and the right most valued by civilized men.’ ”219 As in Frisby
v. Schultz, Hill relies on the protection and advancement of privacy
as a basis for sustaining significant restrictions on speech.
Privacy also has played an important role in the development of
other areas of the law involving speech and access to information.
For example, in construing the scope of the Freedom of Information
Act, the Supreme Court has embraced the importance of protecting
privacy values.220 The Justices have also sustained laws that make
the unauthorized recording of private cell phone conversations the
subject of civil or criminal sanctions.221 Both these outcomes reflect
an effort to reconcile the protection of privacy with a robust commit-
ment to speech. These decisions, and others like them, clearly
demonstrate that even the most robust commitment to facilitating
expressive freedom does not necessarily imply an utter and
complete absence of protection for privacy.
Other important First Amendment cases, presenting privacy
issues less directly, also vindicate privacy interests at the expense
of speech and press rights. For example, in Seattle Times Co. v.
Rhinehart, the Court prohibited a newspaper from publishing truth-
ful information obtained through the civil discovery process because
permitting publication of such material would “violate the First
Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of
religion, and freedom of association.”222
Thus, in important ways, and consistently over time, the Supreme
Court has vindicated privacy interests even when doing so has the
effect of limiting or abridging speech and press rights. I do not mean
to overstate the degree of jurisprudential common ground shared
between the United States and Europe, but I would suggest that
more common ground exists than is commonly supposed.
The key to winning an Article 10 claim before the ECHR is
establishing a link between the material at issue and the process of
democratic self-government. Information integral to this process
generally cannot be suppressed in the name of privacy—even if its
release damages the subject’s dignity, personal honor, or reputation.
219. Id. at 716-17 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)).
220. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157 (2004).
221. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001).
222. 467 U.S. 20, 24-25 (1984) (emphasis added).
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In an important sense then, the operative principle in delimiting the
scope of expressive freedom and privacy turns out to be identical in
the United States and Europe. The key difference is that Europe
defines more narrowly the scope of information reasonably related
to the project of democratic self-government and, in general, trusts
government more reflexively to establish and enforce lines of
demarcation.223
One cannot help but think that U.S. free speech scholars, like
Alexander Meiklejohn224 and Harry Kalven, Jr.,225 would smile: the
U.S. position on the necessity of protecting speech integral to
democratic self-government has achieved, if not universal assent,
then something very close to it. To be sure, it is unlikely that U.S.
citizens would tolerate or trust government to decide what aspects
of a politician’s life are not suitable matters for public disclosure and
debate.226 As Dean Robert Post has observed, in the United States
“[n]o legislation or judicial decree can advance a particular concep-
tion of the proper role of public officials as a basis for excluding
information from the public discourse as ‘irrelevant.’ ”227
European governments have a legal obligation to protect the dig-
nity, personal honor, and reputation of the rich and famous no less
than the average and unremarkable. The European approach vests
great discretion with government officials to draw and enforce lines.
Indeed, the positive aspect of Article 8 essentially forces European
223. Cf. Ariz. Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806, 2825
(2011) (“The First Amendment embodies our choice as a Nation that, when it comes to such
[political] speech, the guiding principle is freedom—the ‘unfettered interchange of ideas’—not
whatever the State may view as fair.”); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 341 (2010) (“The
First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and the ideas that flow from each.”).
224. See MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 22-27, 37-39, 88-91, 94 (arguing that the most
important condition for maintaining democratic self-government is an engaged citizenry who
actively oversee the government through a process of ongoing discussion and dialogue); id. at
37 (“In the last resort, it is not our representatives who govern us. We govern ourselves, using
them. And we do so in such ways as our own free judgment may decide.”).
225. Kalven, Jr., supra note 202, at 204, 208-09. As Kalven states the proposition, “The
[First] Amendment has a ‘central meaning’—a core of protection of speech without which
democracy cannot function, without which, in Madison’s phrase, ‘the censorial power’ would
be in the Government over the people and not ‘in the people over the Government.’” Id. at 208.
226. See Robert Post, Three Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2090 (2001) (“I should
add that for the past forty years the First Amendment has been interpreted to stand for the
proposition that only the public can determine whether information is relevant or irrelevant
for the evaluation of public officials.”).
227. Id.
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governments to undertake this balancing exercise—they simply
cannot default to a free fire zone that privileges any and all press
disclosures regarding public officials, public figures, and matters of
public concern.228 To do so would put them in breach of their legal
obligations under Article 8.229
Thus, the radically different role of the state in making and
enforcing the distinction between matters relevant to democratic
deliberation and matters irrelevant to this process explains some of
the baseline differences between American and European free
speech law. Unlike the European approach, the U.S. approach
leaves very little discretion to elected politicians—or even to
unelected federal judges—to make and enforce civility norms aimed
at protecting a sphere of personal privacy. Even so, the rules in both
places operate to create sufficient breathing room for democratic
self-government to operate. The U.S. field of play may be broader
and more open, but the European approach seeks to advance and
secure the same values.
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY GOING FORWARD: CHALLENGES AND
ISSUES IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA
Both the United States and Europe are going to face serious new
challenges to securing privacy; many of these challenges will arise
from the ability of computers to gather, sort, and deploy data in
ways that compromise personal privacy. In this Part, I will sketch
some of the larger issues associated with reconciling privacy and
speech that will need to be addressed going forward in both soci-
eties, notably including the problems presented by Big Data and
pervasive forms of government surveillance. Depending on how one
draws the line demarcating the right of privacy and the rights to
freedom of speech and the press, the scope of protected personal
228. Von Hannover v. Germany, 2004-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 47.
229. Fernández Martínez v. Spain, App. No. 56030/07, at 3-6, 28-30 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2014),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-145068?TID=enqiwuikux [http://perma.
cc/9JBC-97M8]; Söderman v. Sweden, App. No. 5786/08, at 21-23 (Eur. Ct. H.R. 2013),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/webservices/content/pdf/001-128043?TID=mpdiodvsxq [http://perma.
cc/LM63-8BZG]; X & Y v. The Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 11-14 (1985).
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privacy could be radically diminished in the not-too-distant
future.230
The ECHR has not addressed issues associated with metadata as
clearly, or as recently, as the Court of Justice of the European Union
(CJEU). The CJEU, the highest juridical body of the European
Union, recognizes and incorporates the European Convention and
the ECHR’s precedents into its own jurisprudence.231 Accordingly,
the CJEU’s recent decisions on the right to be forgotten and the
storage and use of metadata by European Union member-state gov-
ernments are highly relevant to the question of reconciling privacy
and speech in this important context. They also incorporate and
reflect another pan-European source of human rights jurisprudence.
In May 2014, in Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de
Protección de Datos (AEPD), the CJEU embraced a “right to be
forgotten” on the web.232 More specifically, the CJEU ruled that EU
regulations on data processing apply to search engines (such as
Google) and that Directive 95/46 vests the subject of information
available on the Internet with the right to demand that it be deleted
from search engine results.233 The case arose when Mr. Costeja
González, a Spanish citizen, lodged a complaint with the AEPD (the
Spanish Agency for Data Protection).234 González asked the AEPD
to order search engine providers to alter or remove several old news-
paper stories about him published in La Vanguardia containing
personal information related to an involuntary auction of his
230. See, e.g., Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2653, 2668-72 (2011) (rejecting a
privacy-based defense of a state law that sought to limit the sale of physician prescription
data in order to protect the privacy of physicians and their patients). For a thoughtful
discussion of Sorrell’s potential impact on statutory privacy protections, see Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36 VT. L. REV.
855 (2011). Professor Bhagwat posits that, if broadly construed and applied, Sorrell could
“have dramatic, and extremely troubling, implications for a broad range of existing and
proposed rules that seek to control disclosure of personal information in order to protect
privacy.” Id. at 856.
231. See supra notes 10-19 and accompanying text.
232. Case C-131/12 (Ct. Justice E.U. May 13, 2014), http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/
document.jsf?text=&docid=152065&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=fir
st&part=1&cid=22838 [http://perma.cc/NL74-8NTW].
233. Id. ¶¶ 98-99.
234. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
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property to satisfy an outstanding legal debt owed to the govern-
ment.235
AEPD denied relief with respect to the newspaper itself but
granted relief with respect to Google Spain.236 The agency “took the
view that it has the power to require the withdrawal of data and the
prohibition of access to certain data by the operators of search
engines” in circumstances when “the locating and disseminating of
the data are liable to compromise the fundamental right to data
protection and the dignity of persons in the broad sense.”237 The
agency also found that operators of search engines were engaged in
data processing and liable to orders to block certain results from
appearing in response to search queries.238 The Spanish domestic
courts affirmed the AEPD’s order.239
Google Spain appealed the adverse decisions of AEPD and the
Spanish domestic courts to the CJEU.240 On appeal, the CJEU found
that search engines engage in data processing when generating
results.241 As the court explained, “the operator of a search engine
‘collects’ such data which it subsequently ‘retrieves,’ ‘records’ and ‘or-
ganizes’ within the framework of its indexing programmes, ‘stores’
on its servers and, as the case may be, ‘discloses’ and ‘makes
available’ to users in the form of search results.”242 Under the terms
of Directive 95/46, Article 2(b), search engine operators constitute
“data processors.”243 This finding, in turn, has significant legal
implications because Directive 95/46 requires data processors to
respond to requests to delete or correct information that is “incom-
plete or inaccurate.”244 Data processors must consider and respond
to all such requests.245
The CJEU’s holding that web search engines constitute data
processing operators therefore imposed significant new liabilities;
235. Id.
236. Id. ¶¶ 16-17.
237. Id. ¶ 17.
238. See id.
239. Id. ¶¶ 18-19.
240. Id.
241. Id. ¶ 41.
242. Id. ¶ 28.
243. Id. ¶ 41.
244. Council Directive 95/46, art. 12(b), 1995 O.J. (L 281) 31, 42 (EC).
245. Id. art. 14(a).
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search engine operators must ensure that their “activity meets the
requirements of Directive 95/46 in order that the guarantees laid
down by the directive may have full effect and that effective and
complete protection of data subjects, in particular of their right to
privacy, may actually be achieved.”246 Accordingly, a search engine
operator “must ensure, within the framework of its responsibilities,
powers and capabilities, that the processing meets the requirements
of Directive 95/46.”247
The CJEU’s path to recognizing a “right to be forgotten” involves
the creative manipulation of Directive 95/46. As noted earlier,
search engine operators incur an obligation to remove incomplete or
erroneous information as a consequence of the CJEU classifying
them as data processors.248 In the abstract, such an obligation to
correct errors or omissions should not be seen as particularly
objectionable. In the United States, for example, a credit reporting
service, such as Equifax, has a legal duty to correct errors on its
reports when such errors are called to its attention.249 If a search
engine operator is disseminating erroneous information, a good
argument exists that it should cease providing information that it
knows to be objectively false or misleading in search results provid-
ed to search engine users. However, the CJEU did not stop at this
point, and held more broadly that truthful and entirely accurate
information must be subject to deletion from search engine
results.250 In other words, at some point, the subject of data should
246.  Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 38.
247. Id. ¶ 83.
248. See id. ¶ 62.
249. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681T (2012); see James P. Nehf, A Legislative Framework for
Reducing Fraud in the Credit Repair Industry, 70 N.C. L. REV. 781,786-98 (1992) (providing
a comprehensive overview of the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) and how it protects
consumers from inaccurate or erroneous credit report information); Lea Shepard, Toward a
Stronger Financial History Antidiscrimination Norm, 53 B.C. L. REV. 1695, 1744-49 (2012)
(discussing the FCRA and its protection of consumers from inaccurate or erroneous entries
on their credit history reports). The FCRA “require[s] that consumer reporting agencies adopt
reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel,
insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer,
with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such
information.” 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b); see Nehf, supra, at 786 (“Enacted in 1970 as a new title to
the Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1968, the FCRA aims to protect consumers from
inaccurate or obsolete information in reports that businesses use to determine a person's
eligibility for credit, employment, or insurance.”).
250. See Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶¶ 89-94.
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have the power to suppress the dissemination of embarrassing, but
dated, personal information on the Internet.251
González argued that the corrections requirements set forth in
Article 12(b) and Article 14(a) should be broadly read to encompass
a right “to be ‘forgotten’ after a certain time.”252 The CJEU agreed
with this contention and held that delivering truthful information
was incompatible with Directive 95/46 when the information provid-
ed was true but “inadequate, irrelevant, or no longer relevant, or
excessive in relation to those purposes and in light of the time that
has elapsed.”253 In such circumstances, “the information and links
concerned in the list of results must be erased.”254 Accordingly,
under E.U. law, a “right to be forgotten” now exists, and those
providing information through search engines have a legal obliga-
tion to receive, consider, and respond to requests to block access to
information that subjects object to having disseminated. Moreover,
the easiest and least risky response to such a request is simply to
delete the objectionable search result.
The potential effects of a right to be forgotten on the freedom of
speech are both obvious and negative. In fact, the European Union’s
Advocate General had urged the CJEU to reject this doctrine
because “[i]n contemporary information society, the right to search
information published on the internet by means of search engines
is one of the most important ways to exercise that fundamental
right [of freedom of expression].”255 Moreover, “[a]n internet user’s
right to information would be compromised if his search for
information concerning an individual did not generate search
results providing a truthful reflection of the relevant web pages but
a ‘bowdlerised’ version thereof.”256 The Advocate General asserted,
251. Google has agreed to remove content from European search results based on requests
from individuals for such removals. See Sam Schechner, Google Pivots on Privacy, WALL ST.
J., May 31, 2014, at B1. Google has “unveil[ed] a Web page where Europeans can request that
the company take down links tied to individuals’ names.” Id. Within hours of placing this page
online, “the company received 12,000 requests to remove links from across Europe, an average
of 20 requests a minute.” Id.
252. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 89.
253. Id. ¶ 93.
254. Id. ¶ 94.
255. Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen ¶ 131, Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, http://
curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?docid=138782&doclang=EN [http://perma.cc/
Z7W7-3MT8].
256. Id.
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unsuccessfully, that “[a]n internet search engine service provider
lawfully exercises both his freedom to conduct business and freedom
of expression when he makes available internet information location
tools relying on a search engine.”257 Thus, even if the subject of
information wished for truthful information currently available on
the web “to be consigned to oblivion,” Directive 95/46 should not be
interpreted to provide such relief.258
The CJEU did not completely ignore the free speech interest at
stake. If a web search engine provider can demonstrate that “the
preponderant interest of the general public” favors “access to the
information in question,” then the search result need not be
deleted.259 In the case of the information regarding the sale of Mr.
González’s property to satisfy a liability to the government, “there
do not appear to be particular reasons substantiating a preponder-
ant interest of the public”260 in having access to the information;
accordingly the CJEU ordered “those links to be removed from the
list of results.”261
The CJEU’s recent landmark decision on data retention also
favored privacy interests—although in a context that did not involve
a corresponding burden on free speech or free press rights. In Digi-
tal Rights Ireland Ltd. v. Minister for Communications, Marine, &
Natural Resources, the CJEU invalidated Directive 2006/24, which
required member states to enact regulations that mandated the
storage of all electronic communications for not less than six months
and not more than two years.262 As the CJEU explained, “Directive
257. Id. ¶ 132.
258. Id. ¶ 138.
259. Google Spain SL, Case C-131/12, ¶ 99.
260. Id. ¶ 98.
261. Id.
262. Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12,¶ 11-16 (Ct. Justice E.U. Apr. 8, 2014), http://curia.
europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=150642&pageIndex=0&doclang=En
&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=1061279 [http://perma.cc/54C5-A8WL]; see also
Council Directive 2006/24, art. 6, 2006 O.J. (L105) 54, 58 (EC) (“Member states shall ensure
that the categories of data specified in Article 5 are retained for periods of not less than six
months and not more than two years from the date of the communication.”). It bears noting
that member states were free to prescribe longer periods of retention subject to approval by
the EU’s Commission. See id. art. 12(1) (“A Member State facing particular circumstances
that warrant an extension for a limited period of the maximum retention period referred to
in Article 6 may take the necessary measures. That Member State shall immediately notify
the Commission and inform the other Member States of the measures taken under this Article
and shall state the grounds for introducing them.”).
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2006/24 lays down the obligation on the providers of publicly
available electronic communications services or of public communi-
cations networks to retain certain data which are generated or
processed by them.”263
Directive 2006/46 had virtually no procedural checks or safe-
guards regarding access to the stored data, no individualized
suspicion was necessary to justify storage of a person’s electronic
communications, and the regulation made no effort to tailor the data
gathering and retention program to meet specific law enforcement
needs.264 Moreover, the CJEU noted that “it is not inconceivable that
the retention of the data in question might have an effect on the use,
by subscribers or registered users, of the means of communication
covered by the directive and, consequently, on their exercise of
freedom of expression.”265 As the court explained, “Directive 2006/24
affects, in a comprehensive manner, all persons using electronic
communications services but without the persons whose data are
being retained being, even indirectly, in a situation which is liable
to give rise to criminal prosecutions.”266
The failure to tailor the data gathering, the absence of “substan-
tive and procedural conditions” governing access to the stored data,
the lack of “any objective criterion by which the number of persons
authorised to access and subsequently use the data retained,” the
lack of review of access requests “by a court or by an independent
administrative body,” and the long period of mandatory collection
and storage all led the CJEU to find that Directive 2006/24 “has
exceeded the limits imposed by compliance with the principle of
proportionality.”267 In consequence, the CJEU held that directive
invalid and without any legal force or effect.268
The maintenance of such a massive data collection and retention
program, in the words of the Advocate General’s Opinion, gave rise
to “the vague feeling of surveillance,” which in turn could be
“capable of having a decisive influence on the exercise by European
263. Digital Rights Ir. Ltd., Joined Cases C-293/12 & C-594/12,¶ 16.
264. See id. ¶¶ 48-72.
265. Id. ¶ 28.
266. Id. ¶ 58.
267. See id. ¶¶ 61-62, 69.
268. Id. ¶ 71.
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citizens of their freedom of expression and information.”269 To be
sure, and as the Advocate General also noted, “there is hardly any
doubt that Directive 2006/24 itself constitutes an ‘interference’ with
the right to privacy,”270 but the program implicated more than just
privacy rights. The potential chilling effect of such a program would
distort the marketplace of ideas; simply put, people will not speak
freely if they have good reason to believe that Big Brother is
watching.271
It is undoubtedly true that privacy and speech can, and often do,
call for conflicting outcomes in legal disputes.272 It is simply not
possible to include and also simultaneously not include a story
about an involuntary government auction of property to settle an
outstanding legal obligation in web search results.273 Nor is it
possible to provide and also not provide a twenty-year-old story that
documents a person’s dabbling with New Age kinky sex.274 In such
cases, these human rights values are conflicting, and there is simply
no way to advance both privacy and speech concurrently.
Big data programs present a very different case from the newly
forged “right to be forgotten” with respect to the relationship
between privacy and speech. Both privacy and speech suffer when
government records and saves all of our electronic communications
269. Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón ¶ 51, Digital Rights Ir. Ltd., Joined Cases
C-293/12 & C-594/12, http://curia.europa.eu/juris/document/document.jsf?text=&docid=
145562&pageIndex=0&doclang=EN&mode=lst&dir=&occ=first&part=1&cid=625493
[http://perma.cc/ DJ5C-8VJB].
270. Id. ¶ 68.
271. In fact, the Advocate General directly cited the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudence
on the chilling effect doctrine in its argument to the CJEU. See id. ¶ 52 n.46; see also Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 194-95 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that a pro-
scription against public university faculty members belonging to “subversive” or “Communist-
front” organizations violates the First Amendment because the policy “has an unmistakable
tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate
and practice”); Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the
“Chilling Effect,” 58 B.U. L. REV. 685, 693 (1978) (“A chilling effect occurs when individuals
seeking to engage in activity protected by the [F]irst [A]mendment are deterred from doing
so by government[al] regulation not specifically directed at that protected activity.”); Monica
Youn, The Chilling Effect and the Problem of Private Action, 66 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1481-95
(2013) (discussing the chilling effect doctrine and its jurisprudential origins).
272. See supra Part II.
273. See Google Spain SL v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Case C-
131/12,¶¶ 14-17 (Ct. Justice E.U. May 13, 2014).
274. See Sam Schechner, Tantric Sex Workshop Gets “Forgotten,” WALL ST. J., July 19-20,
2014, at B4.
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incident to society-wide surveillance programs—just in case they
should prove useful at some indefinite point in the future. As Profes-
sor Neil Richards cogently argued “[d]emocratic societies should ...
reject the idea that it is reasonable for the government to record all
Internet and telephone activity with or without authorization.”275
Richards is quite correct to posit that “unconstrained surveillance,
especially of our intellectual activities, threatens a cognitive
revolution that cuts at the core of the freedom of the mind that our
political institutions presuppose.”276 In this context, then, privacy
and speech must be seen as complementary, rather than competing,
human rights values.
Digital Rights Ireland reflected and incorporated this understand-
ing, and accordingly, could provide a helpful blueprint for the
United States federal courts when litigation involving PRISM and
other mass surveillance programs that involve the society-wide
collection and retention of electronic data appears at bar. Simply
put, speech and privacy are integral to each other in important re-
spects, and we should be careful not to miss the forest for the trees.
A society without privacy will not long be a society with free speech.
Alexander Meiklejohn famously cautioned that “[p]olitical self-
government comes into being only insofar as the common judgment,
the available intelligence, of the community takes control over all
interests, only insofar as its authority over them is recognized and
is effective.”277 But self-government requires an engaged and
informed electorate. As Meiklejohn puts it, “When a free man is
voting, it is not enough that the truth is known by someone else, by
some scholar or administrator or legislator.”278 Instead, “[t]he voters
must have it, all of them.”279 The First Amendment, from this
vantage point, exists so that “all the citizens shall, so far as possible,
understand the issues which bear upon our common life.”280
The freedom of thought required to sustain democratic self-
government—notably including an individual and collective power
to pursue ideas to their logical conclusions—requires an ability to
275. Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1961 (2014).
276. Id. at 1964.
277. MEIKLEJOHN, supra note 20, at 69.
278. Id. at 88.
279. Id.
280. Id. at 88-89.
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ask and answer hard questions free and clear of government control
or coercion. As Richards observes, “free minds are the foundation of
a free society,”281 but in a surveillance state, minds are not, and
cannot be, free. One cannot freely engage with the future while in
abject fear of the government scrutinizing one’s past. It is not
possible to look forward and backward, over your shoulder, at the
same time.282
In the age of metadata, privacy constitutes a kind of precondition
to speech, just as assembly constitutes a necessary antecedent activ-
ity to petitioning.283 At the macro level, privacy and speech are both
essential conditions for the maintenance and functioning of a
democratic polity. The CJEU seems to have recognized this impor-
tant link in Digital Rights Ireland and has acted to secure privacy
in order to safeguard speech. The U.S. federal courts should strongly
consider following the CJEU’s lead on this important question.
We also should be careful not to allow conflicts in discrete
contexts to obscure the larger symbiotic relationship that exists
between privacy and speech. Google Spain and Digital Rights
Ireland provide very different vantage points on the necessary rela-
tionship between speech and privacy in the era of Big Data. Google
Spain, to U.S. eyes at least, represents a disturbing elevation of
privacy rights over the ability of would-be listeners and viewers to
obtain true, nonmisleading information. May politicians and public
figures seek to scrub their pasts clean of embarrassing, but truthful,
incidents? Some preliminary evidence involving requests to scrub
web search results suggests that the answer to this question could
easily be “yes.”284 The implications of this doctrine for speech related
to democratic self-government are plainly bad.
281. Richards, supra note 275, at 1946.
282. See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387, 403-04 (2008).
283. See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR., RECLAIMING THE PETITION CLAUSE: SEDITIOUS
LIBEL, “OFFENSIVE” PROTEST, AND THE RIGHT TO PETITION THE GOVERNMENT FOR A REDRESS
OF GRIEVANCES 5-6 (2012) (noting that James Madison intentionally linked the right of assem-
bly with the right of petition because assembly “is an antecedent activity to petitioning”).
284. See, e.g., Ruth Bender, Google Ordered to Remove Sex Images, WALL ST. J., Nov. 7,
2013, at B3 (reporting on a French court order requiring the removal of nine sexually explicit
images of Max Mosley, who headed the Formula One racing organization); Schechner, supra
note 251 (noting that Google recently had deleted a Wall Street Journal story on Greg
Lindae’s involvement with a New Age “workshop” in the late 1990s).
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On the other hand, Digital Rights Ireland reflects a clear under-
standing of the necessary and essential relationship of privacy to
speech. To the extent that Google Spain should give a reasonable
observer pause about its extreme privileging of privacy over speech,
Digital Rights Ireland provides a potential road map for U.S.
domestic courts grappling with how best to respond to the creation
of a new surveillance state apparatus in the United States.
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have attempted to show how speech and press
rights retain significant salience in Europe and how privacy,
although embattled, retains social and legal importance in the
United States. To be sure, the standard account largely gets things
right: privacy, dignity, and personal honor do have broader relative
salience in European jurisprudence than in the United States. But
to say that privacy matters more in European human rights
jurisprudence is not to say that speech and press rights will always
and invariably fail in the face of privacy claims.
Similarly, the standard account of the role and importance of
expressive freedoms accurately describes the general warp and weft
of the accommodation of these interests when they come into conflict
in the United States. In many instances post-New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, the U.S. Supreme Court has subordinated protecting
privacy, dignity, and personal honor in order to provide broad pro-
tection to freedom of speech and press. The Justices have done so as
part of a broader effort to vindicate “a profound national commit-
ment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may well include
vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on
government and public officials.”285 As Chief Justice Rehnquist
explained in Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, “in the world of de-
bate about public affairs, many things done with motives that are
less than admirable are protected by the First Amendment.”286
285. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 51 (1988) (“Such criticism, inevitably, will not always be reasoned or
moderate; public figures as well as public officials will be subject to ‘vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks.’” (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270)).
286. 485 U.S. at 53.
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Thus, dignitarian concerns routinely give way to the imperatives of
the First Amendment.287 But to say that speech generally trumps
privacy is not to say that speech always or invariably trumps
privacy—and dignity—interests.
Despite these important differences, common ground exists and
should not be ignored. To a degree that seems to have escaped much
notice, the framing devices used in contemporary European
jurisprudence generally track the language and jurisprudential logic
of Sullivan. Public officials, public figures, and those involved in
matters of public concern hold diminished privacy interests relative
to purely private citizens even if the overall baseline for securing
privacy and dignity is significantly higher overall in Europe than in
the United States. Thus, Justice Brennan’s vision of free speech as
a means of facilitating democratic self-government has become an
important part of the fundamental rights jurisprudence of the
ECHR (and, by implication, constitutes part of the human rights
law of the signatory states to the European Convention).
In sum, although we should not lose sight of the points of conflict
(and they are many), we also should not fail to appreciate the signif-
icant points of tangent that exist between the U.S. and European
approaches to reconciling privacy with speech. At the end of the day,
the pervasive distrust of government that prevails in the United
States makes broad-based mandatory civility norms unacceptable
even while such rules are quite quotidian in Europe. But to a
significant extent, the United States and Europe share a deep-
seated commitment to safeguarding speech as an essential condition
necessary for the project of democratic self-government to succeed.
So too, we should take care not to overlook the necessary rela-
tionship between privacy and speech with respect to the project of
democratic self-government more generally. A surveillance state
may be many things, but it cannot be a true democracy. If “We the
People” are truly to superintend the institutions of government, we
must have the ability to engage each other without an omnipresent
state superintending our deliberative process. In many fundamental
ways, privacy does not so much conflict with speech as facilitate it.
287. See id. at 55 (“ ‘Outrageousness’ in the area of political and social discourse has an
inherent subjectiveness about it which would allow a jury to impose liability on the basis of
the jurors’ tastes or views, or perhaps on the basis of their dislike of a particular expression.”).
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In celebrating our robust jurisprudential commitment to free
speech in the United States, we must not undervalue privacy—both
against the government and also with respect to powerful private
corporations. A society without privacy might not necessarily be a
society without speech, but speech in such a society will undoubt-
edly be more limited, less vibrant, and substantially more circum-
scribed than in a society with meaningful privacy protections. At the
end of the day, and in some important ways, privacy and speech
constitute complementary, rather than conflicting, human rights.
